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I. THE TROUBLED DESTINY OF CAP-AND-TRADE
The recent air regulations of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) have adopted a cap-and-trade scheme that economists love. The
traditional model of environmental regulation of individual sources of
emissions to the environment has been supplanted by setting a regional cap on
emissions, allocating parties allowances to emit, and letting entities buy and
sell the allowances which are a license to emit pollutants: Cap and Trade.1
"Cap-and-trade" has taken on iconic status; it is the mechanism for the Kyoto
Protocol on international climate change; 2 it is the new mode of Washington
market-based air regulation; 3 it is the metric for modern environmental
regulation.
I Cap and Trade, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/captrade/basic-info.html (last
visited Oct. 13, 2014) ("Cap and trade is a market-based policy tool for protecting human health
and the environment by controlling large amounts of emissions from a group of sources. A cap
and trade program first sets an aggressive cap, or maximum limit, on emissions. Sources covered
by the program then receive authorizations to emit in the form of emissions allowances, with the
total amount of allowances limited by the cap. Each source can design its own compliance
strategy to meet the overall reduction requirement, including the sale or purchase of allowances,
installation of pollution controls, and implementation of efficiency measures, among other
options. Individual control requirements are not specified under a cap and trade program, but
each emission source must surrender allowances equal to its actual emissions in order to comply.
Sources must also completely and accurately measure and report all emissions in a timely manner
to guarantee that the overall cap is achieved.").
2 See STEVEN FERREY, UNLOCKING THE GLOBAL WARMING TOOLBOX: KEY CHOICES FOR
CARBON RESTRICTION AND SEQUESTRATION 51-54 (Stephen Hill & Tony Quinn eds., 2010).
3 See infra Part II.
[Vol. 117
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The federal courts have begged to differ: the federal environmental
agency has been sued every year for the past half-dozen years regarding cap-
and-trade programs and has been ruled to have acted illegally every year. To be
effective, EPA policy choices must survive legal challenge. Cap-and-trade is
the target of a recent barrage of litigation challenging its legality at both the
federal and state levels.4 The result has been an almost unbroken string of
federal court decisions finding the EPA's various cap-and-trade air regulations
to be illegal in various iterations year after year.5 State cap-and-trade
environmental regulation has been implemented recently in a few states to
mitigate climate change, and suits involving California,6 Massachusetts, 7 and
New York8 cap-and-trade regulation have set back environmental climate
control programs in each of these states.
There are defined legal boundaries in a federalist system. U.S. Clean
Air Act 9 regulations proceed with distinct roles at both the federal and state
levels. Crossing these jurisdictional boundaries triggers legal challenges. When
establishing environmental regulations based on science and numeric values, a
reasonable quantitative method and determination, a factual scientific basis,
and regulatory precision are essential for factual and legal support. Trading of
capped pollution rights, while flexible and market-based, is not always
authorized for all pollutants in congressional legislation.
10
Although new in design, its record of success to date is, at best, mixed
at the federal level, and mixed when looking at state cap-and-trade regulation
of global warming gases, with several appeals still pending." Cap-and-trade at
the federal level until 2014 has been a neutron bomb, destroying progress of the
regulatory programs around it. This Article sifts through the aftermath in the
legal blast zone at both the federal and state levels. Part II examines the full
history of federal EPA cap-and-trade regulation that has been challenged
successfully in federal courts every year since 2008. We examine lessons on
what is still standing after several years of ligation against cap-and-trade, and
the recent reversal in the Supreme Court.
Part III shifts our focus to litigation pursuant to state law claims against
state environmental cap-and-trade regulation of global warming gases. These
4 See infra Parts II, III.
5 See infra Part II.
6 See infra Part V.A.
7 See infra Part IV.B. 1.
8 See infra Part III.F.
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (2013).
10 This issue will be raised when the EPA attempts to utilize section 111 (d) of the Clean Air
Act for trading greenhouse gas (GHG) emission credits for power generation facilities. Section
111 (d) does not explicitly contemplate a tradable credit, as do other parts of the Act. See 42
U.S.C. § 7411 (d); see also 42 U.S.C. § 765 lb(b).
I I See infra Parts II-IV.
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claims assert administrative law violations by state environmental agencies.
Part IV analyzes the legal flip-side of state cap-and-trade challenges pursuant to
the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution rather than state-law
claims. Again, the record is less than reassuring. Part V compares the results to
date and draws conclusions about the future legal fate of cap-and-trade
mechanisms as a sustainable regulatory tool at the federal and state levels.
As the new mechanism of regulatory choice at the state, federal, and
international levels, the brief but tumultuous career of cap-and-trade regulation
is sculpting the contours of 21st century environmental regulation in a market
economy. We start with legal challenges to federal cap-and-trade regulation.
II. THE "CHECKMATE" LEGAL RECORD OF FEDERAL "CAP-AND-TRADE"
REGULATION
Federal cap-and-trade has had a notably distinct legal fate in
comparison to cap-and-trade environmental legislation at the state level. 12 We
will start on the federal legal front. The key initial question is how the EPA has
devised and used cap-and-trade, and the follow-up question is how
environmental cap-and-trade regulatory mechanisms have fared in the courts.
Cap-and-trade mechanisms are a relatively new phenomenon in the past two
decades, which nonetheless is approximately half the period of modern
environmental law.13 They have been challenged, and in a majority of cases
have been overturned, with the D.C. Circuit hearing most of these challenges.
14
Cap-and-trade as an environmental regulatory mechanism was initiated
in Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 for sulfur dioxide
emissions in a national allowance trading program.'5 Aimed at lowering acid
rain and improving public health, the Acid Rain Program set up a cap-and-trade
approach to regulate the amount of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide
(NOx) emissions. 16 According to an EPA study, SO2 emissions from power
plants were 9% lower than 2000 levels and 41% lower than 1980 levels; NO,
emissions had a 13% reduction in 2002 from 2000 levels, and a 33% decline
from 1990 levels.' 7 SO2 emission levels were well below projected levels with
12 See infra Part III.
13 Modem environmental regulation and law began in 1970, with passage of, in quick
succession, the Clean Air Act Amendments, the Clean Water Act, the National Environmental
Policy Act, and other federal regulations. See STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES
& EXPLANATIONS 41 (6th ed. 2012) [hereinafter EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS].
14 See infra Part II.
15 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7661.
16 Cap and Trade: Acid Rain Program Results, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
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8.95 million tons emitted in 2007, well below the emissions cap of 9.5 million
tons. 18
Sulfur' was the first criteria pollutant ° so regulated, with nitrogen 2l
following. Cap-and-trade was employed for the Ozone Transport Commission
to control cross-border ozone pollution in northeast states through an NO,
trading program.2 2 This evolved into the larger 22-state region of the Ozone
Transport Assessment Group NOx Budget Trading Program, including the NOx
State Implementation Plan (SIP) Call requiring states to revise their SIPs to
take account of cross-border NOx pollution, allowing banking and cap-and-
trading of credits.23
Nitrogen and sulfur remained the primary targets of cap-and-trade
regulation. In 2005, the EPA promulgated the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR)
cap-and-trade regulation to cover sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides.24
California also promulgated a cap-and-trade program in southern California's
air control management district.2 In recent years, cap-and-trade has shifted as
the preferred tool for regulation of carbon dioxide, which is not a criteria
pollutant under the Clean Air Act.26 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI)27 and California's Assembly Bill 32 carbon regulation program2 8 both
adopted cap-and-trade programs.
These cap-and-trade regulatory mechanisms, employed by the
environmental agencies of both the federal and state governments, have been
the subject of consistent challenges, typically ultra vires claims, abuse of
administrative process, or claims that the regulatory choice is arbitrary and
capricious. The agencies have not fared well attempting to justify their cap-and-
18 Acid Rain Program 2007 Progress Report, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
airmarkets/progress/arp07.html (last updated Apr. 14, 2009).
19 STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 184 (6th ed. 2013) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW].
20 For a discussion of the criteria of pollutants and their impacts on health and the
environment, see id. at 182-85.
21 Id. at 184.
22 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(a) (2013).
23 40 C.F.R. §§ 51, 72, 75, 96 (2012).
24 40 C.F.R. §§ 51, 72-74, 77-78, 96 (2012).
25 EPA, EPA's EVALUATION OF THE RECLAIM PROGRAM IN THE SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY
MANAGEMENT DISTRICT i, 1, 12 (2002), available at http://epa.gov/Region09/air/reclaim/
reclaim-report.pdf.
26 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 19, at 184, 246-50 (providing a list of the criteria
pollutants as well as carbon control mechanisms in the United States, the European Union, and
internationally).
27 Memorandum of Understanding, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Dec. 20, 2005)
[hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding], available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou-
12 20-05.pdf.
28 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501 (2007).
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trade programs under applicable law.2 9 There have been typically two, but at
least one, new cap-and-trade environmental regulatory programs legally
stricken by the federal courts in each of the past half dozen years, which
includes most of the limited number of cap-and-trade programs that exist:
* 2008: Challenged by states and stricken by the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals was the EPA's mercury rule,
in which the court characterized the EPA's rationale as
"the logic of the Queen of Hearts, substituting EPA
desires for the plain text [of the Clean Air Act]. '
* 2008: CAIR's 2005 cap-and-trade program required
states to prohibit emissions that "contribute[]
significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with
maintenance by, any other State with respect to...
[National Ambient Air Quality Standards]." ' The D.C.
Circuit struck this cap-and-trade regulation as
"arbitrary and capricious," "not otherwise in
accordance with the law," and "fundamentally
flawed.
3 2
29 See infra Parts II-111.
30 New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
31 North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2008) modified on reh'g, 550 F.3d
1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2013). CAIR was promulgated to
comply with section 11 0(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) of the Clean Air Act addressing interstate air pollution.
CAIR was intended to reduce or eliminate the impact of upwind sources on attainment of
National Ambient Air Quality Standards in downwind states relating to particulates and smog. In
part, CAIR was a response to concerns that the NO, SIP Call cap-and-trade system addressed in
Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000), was not sufficiently reducing interstate air
pollution. See Patricia Ross McCubbin, Cap and Trade Programs Under the Clean Air Act:
Lessons from the Clean Air Interstate Rule and the NO, SIP Call, 18 PENN ST. ENvTL. L. REV. 1,
10 n.51 (2009) (noting that 23 states were required to reduce both annual SO 2 and NO,
emissions, while 20 states were required to reduce NO, emissions during the May through
September ozone season).
32 North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 918, 930. The D.C. Circuit decided to "vacate CAIR
because very little [would] 'survive[] remand in anything approaching recognizable form."' Id. at
929 (citations omitted). The court held that CAIR was "arbitrary and capricious" and "not
otherwise in accordance with the law." Id. at 918. The EPA's state apportionment decisions were
found to be "fundamentally flawed" and unfair. The court opined that the "EPA must redo its
analysis from the ground up" because the decisions allow upwind sources to purchase tradable
allowances rather than actually reduce their pollution and contribute to congressional
requirements to have emission sources within the state measurably reduce pollution. Id. at 929-
30. EPA quantitative trading budgets were never rationalized; the EPA had insufficiently
explained how it arrived at the 50% and 65% reduction figures. Id. at 918. The cap-and-trade
system could externalize responsibility by transferring actual reduction from the regulated state
to other tradable sources, thus allowing upwind states to continue creating pollution contributing
to downwind state nonattainment with Clean Air Act goals. Id.
[Vol. 117
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* 2009: Challenged by an environmental organization
and stricken again by the D.C. Circuit was the EPA's
cap-and-trade emission trading program in ozone
nonattainment areas pursuant to the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990.
33
0 2009: A challenge to the application of the RGGI cap-
and-trade system in New York, one of the states
implementing it, resulted in New York promptly
settling in favor of the challenging plaintiffs.34
* 2010: The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated
the EPA's cap-and-trade regulation for
hydrochlorofluorocarbons, which originally were
regulated by the Montreal Protocol and are a global
warming gas.35
* 2011: California's Low Carbon Fuel Standard was
challenged on constitutional grounds. The federal trial
court found the regulation unconstitutional 36 but was
subsequently reversed by a split court of appeals.
37
* 2012: After CAIR cap-and-trade was stricken in 2008,
the EPA issued and substituted the Cross-State Air
Pollution Rule (CSAPR) addressing interstate air
transport of SO2 and NOx contributing to ground-level
ozone and fine particle pollution from fossil fuel-fired
power plants in 27 eastern states. 38 The D.C. Circuit
33 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
34 Indeck Energy Sues State Questioning Legality of Regional Greenhouse Gas Program,
CLEAN TECH. Bus. REv. (Jan. 29, 2009), http://wind.cleantechnology-business-review.com/
news/indeck-energy-sues-state-questioning-egality-of regional-greenhouse-gas-program-09
0129 [hereinafter Indeck Energy].
35 Arkema, Inc. v. EPA, 618 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
36 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
37 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
38 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2013); Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate
Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg.
48,208, 48,216 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97). CSAPR
requires significant reductions in SO2 and NO., Hazardous Air Pollutants including mercury
from electric power, and certain PM 2.5 precursor emissions, with intrastate and limited interstate
trading. Fact Sheet: The Cross-State Air Pollution Rule: Reducing the Interstate Transport of
Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
airtransport/CSAPR/ pdfs/CSAPRFactsheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) [hereinafter Cross-
State Air Pollution Rule]. SO2 is a precursor to PM 2.5 formation and NO, is a precursor to both
ozone and PM2.5 formation. Id. This rule is part of a suite of other state and federal rules that,
together, would result in power plant emissions reductions of 73% for sulfur dioxide (SO2) and
2014]
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struck the CSAPR, in part, because it did not defer to
SIPs and state discretion in implementation under the
split federal-state authority of the Clean Air Act. 39 The
court took a "hard look" and held that one level of
government cannot cross the federalist line of its
jurisdiction "down the rabbit hole. ' 4° The EPA asked
the Supreme Court for certiorari, and was opposed in
this motion by 14 states, while 9 states supported
certiorari. 4' The Supreme Court granted certiorari
42
and, in 2014, reversed the D.C. Circuit decision.43
* 2012: Not involving cap-and-trade regulation but
crossing the federalist line of jurisdiction, the Fifth
Circuit struck the EPA's taking control of the Texas
New Source Review permit provisions of the Clean
Air Act as an arbitrary and capricious disruption of
cooperative federalism.
44
* 2013: The D.C. Circuit upheld federal imposition of air
quality standards on states whose plans were not able
to achieve federal clean air requirements.45
* 2013: California's cap-and-trade system for carbon
control was unsuccessfully challenged as beyond state
54% for nitrous oxide (NO.). Id. The EPA estimates that if all affected power plants were in full
compliance with CSAPR, "[a]pproximately 70% of the power generated from coal-fired power
plants [in states covered by the rule would] come from units with state-of-the-art SO 2 controls,"
and roughly 50% of that power would "come from units with state-of-the-art NOx controls." Id.
39 EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012). While employing
a different mechanism than CAIR to address cross-state pollution, the court found that it required
some states to reduce emissions by more than they contributed to downwind state pollution. Id.
Fifteen states sought review of CSAPR, while six states intervened to support the rule. Id.
40 Id.
41 EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013). Briefs were filed on
May 29, 2013, and oral arguments were heard on December 10, 2013. Environmantal Protection
Agency v. EME Homer City Generation, SCOTUS BLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/environmental-protection-agency-v-eme-homer-city-generation/ (last visited Oct. 19,
2014).
42 See EME Homer City Generation, 133 S. Ct. 2857.
43 See id.
44 Texas v. EPA, 690 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2012).
45 Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA's
imposition of Federal Clean Air Act implementation plans for states that failed to require
Prevention of Significant Deterioration permits for stationary sources that emit GHGs. Id. While
the challenge was dismissed on standing, it distinguished the environmental regulation from the
higher concern on federal coercion of the states identified in the prior Supreme Court decision on
the Affordable Care Act. Id.
[Vol. 117
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authority because it raised extensive amounts of
revenue, with that decision now on appeal.46
As the chess pieces of government have been moved on the board, there have
been several "checks" and "checkmates" of regulatory environmental
initiatives.
A. Mercury: The First Planet in Orbit Around the D.C. Circuit and No
Free Discretion for Use of Cap-and-Trade
We will address each of these chronologically, starting with mercury.
Mercury is the first planet from the sun. It is also a pollutant that is regulated as
a toxic chemical by the Clean Air Act.47 Despite the tight orbit of Mercury,
mercury poses a more serious chemical threat when emitted by coal-burning
power plants and other sources in the United States. It is in this latter capacity
that cap-and-trade regulation was applied to mercury.
In 2000, the EPA determined that mercury emitted by electric
generation units (EGUs) was a Hazardous Air Pollutant (HAP) and therefore
regulated EGUs' emissions of mercury under section 112 of the Clean Air
Act.48 Four years after this determination, the EPA decided it would be more
effective to regulate EGUs with a cap-and-trade system under section 111 of
the Clean Air Act 49 and proceeded to remove EGUs from the list of HAPs in
section 112.50 When challenged, the Federal D.C. Circuit Court in 2008
determined that the EPA acted outside its authority by removing EGU HAPs
from section 112 in a manner other than that prescribed by Congress. 51 Section
112 allows the EPA to delist a HAP only if the agency determines that
"emissions from no source in the category or subcategory concerned ... exceed
a level which is adequate to protect public health with an ample margin of
safety and no adverse environmental effect will result from emissions from any
source." 52 The EPA did not meet this standard when it removed EGUs from the
section 112 list, which was the basis for the court striking this alternative cap-
and-trade system.
The court rejected each of the EPA's three arguments in support of its
administrative action. The agency first argued that its action was appropriately
46 Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. 34-2012-80001313 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2013), available at http://www.calchamber.com/Headlines/Documents/
JointRuling.onSubmittedMatters.pdf.
47 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2013).
48 New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 579 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
49 42 U.S.C. § 7411.
50 New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d at 579-80.
51 Id. at 582.
52 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(9).
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within its administrative discretion under the Chevron53 standard of agency
deference, which requires the court to analyze the EPA's decision by first
asking "whether Congress has directly spoken to the issue. 54 If Congress did
directly speak to the issue, then the EPA does not have interpretive discretion
and it must follow Congress's manifested intent.55 If Congress did not speak
directly to the issue, then the court moves to the second step, which asks
"whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute. 56 The second step allows for significant agency discretion in
interpreting the EPA's authority.
The EPA argued that the second Chevron step was applicable in this
case because section 112(c)(9)-which contains the instructions for removing a
HAP from section 112-is made ambiguous by section 112(n)(1), which says:
"[I]f EPA makes a determination under section 112(n)(1)(A) that power plants
should not be regulated at all under section 112 ... [then] this determination
ipso facto must result in removal of power plants from the section 112(c)
list. ,57
The EPA argued that this language allowed it to bypass the section
1 12(c)(9) delisting requirements if it determined that power plants should be
regulated by another section of the Clean Air Act.58 The court disagreed,
finding that section 112(n)(1)(A) is not applicable after the EPA has listed a
pollutant as a HAP, and therefore, there was no ambiguity.59 As such, the first
step of the Chevron standard applied and the EPA was bound to satisfy the
delisting requirements set forth in section 112(c)(9) of the Act.60
The EPA also argued that an agency has the inherent authority to
reverse an earlier administrative determination or ruling if it has a principled
basis for doing so. 61 According to the court, the agency could have reversed its
decision to regulate EGUs under section 112 prior to listing them, but after
53 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
54 Id. It does this by "employing traditional tools of statutory construction ...." Id. at 843
n.9. If the court deems the statutory language "clear," it simply "give[s] effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 843. If, however, "the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible interpretation of the statute." Id. If the agency interpretation is
permissible, the court defers to that interpretation, and "does not simply impose its own
construction of the statute." Id. at 842-43. The Chevron test can also be deemed not to apply. See
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
55 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
56 Id. at 843.
57 New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
58 Id. at 582-83.
59 Id. at 5 83.
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listing EGUs it may not reverse its decision because Congress expressly limited
the EPA's ability to delist HAPs.62
Finally, the EPA argued that because it had previously removed HAPs
from the list without satisfying the requirements of section 112, it should not be
estopped from doing so in this instance.63 The D.C. Circuit quickly dispatched
this argument by stating, "[W]e do not see how merely applying an
unreasonable statutory interpretation for several years can transform it into a
reasonable interpretation., 64 "Check."
In this first case of mercury to orbit around the D.C. Circuit, the EPA's
discretion was narrowed. One lesson for agencies is that there is not unlimited
discretion to substitute a cap-and-trade market for direct conventional
regulation. If the cap-and-trade system of the EPA is inconsistent with express
language or existing obligations imposed by the Clean Air Act, or the EPA
tried to regulate a pollutant that was already governed by another section of the
Act without delisting the pollutant, the cap-and-trade system was not
permissible. The EPA must follow the direct requirements of congressional
legislation, without unlimited license to substitute administrative innovation.
B. CAIR and the Requirement for Regulatory Precision
Second, the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), promulgated by the EPA
in 2005, required 28 upwind states to "reduce or eliminate the impact of
upwind sources on out-of-state downwind nonattainment of NAAQS [(National
Ambient Air Quality Standards)] for" sulfur dioxide (SO 2) and nitrogen oxides
(NO,).65 CAIR was intended to reduce or eliminate the impact of upwind
sources on attainment of particulate and smog NAAQS in downwind states.
The designated states were to revise their SIPs to include control measures that
would sufficiently reduce their emission of these pollutants. CAIR also
instituted an interstate trading program for SO2 and NOx that would govern all
upwind pollutants not already addressed by an approved SIP.
The first flaw found by the D.C. Circuit in CAIR was the regional
trading system. CAIR allowed states to trade their emissions allowances
regionally, which the court found violated section 1 10(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) of the
Clean Air Act, the so-called "good neighbor" provision. The good neighbor
provision "prohibits sources 'within the State' from 'contribut[ing] significantly
62 Id. at 583.
63 Id.
64 Id. (quoting F.J. Vollmer Co. v. Magaw, 102 F.3d 591, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
65 North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2008), modified on reh 'g, 550 F.3d
1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Critics of CAIR stated that CAIR's long term goals were not strict enough
but admitted that the regulation was a step in the right direction. Id. at 910. On the other hand,
industry officials were concerned that the standards imposed by CAIR were too strict but favored
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to nonattainment in... any other State."' 66 CAIR violated this provision
because it allowed sources in one state to purchase unused allowances from
another state in the region to continue polluting in large amounts that
contributed significantly to a downwind state's nonattainment.
67 The cap-and-
trade system did not guarantee that each state would prohibit sources "within
the state [from] contribut[ing] significantly to nonattainment in... any other
state" because CAIR theoretically allowed one source to maintain or increase
its pollution levels, thereby doing nothing to stop it from violating the good
neighbor provision.68
The D.C. Circuit stated that CAIR was flawed because it ignored the
"interfere with maintenance" language in section 1 l0(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) of the
Clean Air Act. 69 Section 11 0(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) requires SIPs to prohibit sources
from interfering with a downwind state's maintenance of air standard
attainment. 70  CAIR did not independently address the "interfere with
maintenance" provision because the EPA intended to apply the maintenance
provision in conjunction with the "significantly contribute" provision in an
effort to avoid giving greater weight to what the EPA called the "potentially
lesser environmental effect" addressed by the "maintenance" provision.
7I
However, the court found that CAIR's failure to attribute independent
66 Id. at 907 (emphasis in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (2013)). CAIR's
2005 cap-and-trade program required states to prohibit emissions that "contribute significantly to
nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State with respect to...
[NAAQS]." Id. at 908 (emphasis omitted). CAIR was promulgated to comply with section
11 0(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) of the Clean Air Act addressing interstate air pollution. Id.
67 Id. at 907; see also Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. et al., The New Climate World: Achieving
Economic Efficiency in a Federal System for Greenhouse Gas Control Through State Planning
Combined with Federal Programs, 34 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 767, 811-12 (2009)
(reiterating that the focus of the court's objection to CAIR was that it allowed states to interfere
with attainment of NAAQS in another state).
68 North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 907 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (2013)). The court noted that it is possible for CAIR to accomplish the goals
of the good neighbor provision, but that the EPA is not exercising its duty to enforce that
provision unless "it is promulgating a rule that achieves something measureable toward the goal
of prohibiting sources 'within the State' from contributing to nonattainment or interfering with
maintenance 'in any other State."' Id. The court did not expand on what would constitute
"something measurable" and simply concluded that CAIR was not enough. See McCubbin, supra
note 31, at 19-20. However, this ambiguous standard does leave the door open to subsequent
cap-and-trade systems. See id. at 20.
69 North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 908.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 910 (quoting Rulemaking on Section 126 Petition from North Carolina to Reduce
Interestate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone, 71 Fed. Reg. 25,328, 25,337 (Apr.
28, 2006)).
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significance to this additional language in section 10(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) was an
unlawful nullification of that language.72
The court also held that the EPA's allocation of state emission budgets
for SO 2 and NO, were "arbitrary and capricious" in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act 73 because the agency did not adequately explain
how the budgets relate to the goals sought by the "good neighbor" provision.74
In order for the EPA to cap state emissions according to the "good neighbor"
provision, the EPA must show that the chosen cap relates to, and makes
measurable progress towards, the objectives of the "good neighbor"
provision.75 The court found that the EPA did not provide any evidence to show
how the budgets it allocated related to the objectives in section
1 1 0(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).
76
The D.C. Circuit struck this cap-and-trade regulation as "arbitrary and
capricious," "not otherwise in accordance with the law," and "fundamentally
flawed. 77 The D.C. Circuit ultimately struck CAIR because its regional trading
system was too broad and allowed one area within the region to sustain or
increase its significant contribution to a downwind state's nonattainment or
maintenance of attainment. The EPA's state apportionment decisions were
found to be "fundamentally flawed," unfair, and had to be redone "from the
ground up" because they allowed upwind sources to purchase tradable
allowances rather than actually reduce their pollution and contribute to
congressional requirements to have emission sources within the state
measurably reduce pollution.78 The court also struck CAIR on procedural
grounds, finding that the EPA failed to adequately explain how it determined
state emissions budgets and to address provisions of the Clean Air Act that it
was required to enforce independently.
72 Id. at 910-11 (asserting that "[a]ll the policy reasons in the world cannot justify reading a
substantive provision out of a statute").
73 Id. at 921; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (2013).
74 North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 918. EPA quantitative trading budgets were never
rationalized; the EPA had insufficiently explained how it arrived at the 50% and 65% reduction
figures. Id.
75 Id. at 916.
76 Id. at 918.
77 Id. at 918, 929 ("We must vacate CAIR because very little will 'survive[] remand in
anything approaching recognizable form."' CAIR is "arbitrary and capricious" and "not
otherwise in accordance with the law."). In part, CAIR was a response to concerns that the NO,
SIP Call cap-and-trade system addressed in Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000),
was not sufficiently reducing interstate air pollution. See McCubbin, supra note 31, at 9. The
cap-and-trade system could externalize responsibility by transferring actual reduction from the
regulated state to other tradable sources, thus allowing upwind states to continue creating
pollution contributing to downwind state nonattainment with Clean Air Act goals.
78 North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 929.
20141
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The court created limits in this second decision about interpreting a
statute by implementing a mechanism which allows one state, region, or source
to maintain or increase its pollution levels, thereby creating an obligation to
decrease pollution elsewhere, contrary to primary principles of the Clean Air
Act. While this externalization would not be achieved only by a cap-and-trade
environmental scheme, cap-and-trade inherently involves trading a set amount
of emissions credits in order to achieve an emission compliance level. A
trading market in the right to pollute is the fundamental principle of a cap-and-
trade policy. Externalization is a known element of such markets. There have
been some efforts to attempt to restrict the market in which trades could be
executed.
This potential issue could be avoided by legislatively limiting a
source's ability to trade allowances so as not to allow the source to bypass
Clean Air Act obligations. This decision also underscored that when dealing
with quantitative factors, such as pollutants and emissions, facts matter in
picking levels of regulation and the value of credits. When picking regulatory
values, there needs to be a principally derived quantitative value, rather than an
approximation. "Checkmate."
C. Cap-and-Trade Budgets: Efficiency and Equity
Challenged by an environmental organization and stricken again by the
D.C. Circuit was the EPA's cap-and-trade emission trading program in ozone
nonattainment areas pursuant to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.' 9 In
Natural Resource Defense Council v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit addressed the NOx
SIP Call cap-and-trade system for nitrogen oxides (NOx). 80 This EPA system
established an emissions budget for 22 states and the District of Columbia that
limited the state's total emissions during the summer ozone season. The NOx
SIP Call allowed states to meet their emissions target by installing control
technology on sources within the state or by purchasing emissions allowances
from any other states subject to the SIP Call system.8 '
Section 172(c)(1) of the Clean Air Act requires nonattainment areas to
achieve "such reduction in emission from existing sources in the area" through
the application of Reasonably Available Control Technology (RACT).
82 This
cap-and-trade system provided that a nonattainment state did not need to file a
Clean Air Act NOx RACT analysis for emission sources subject to the cap-and-
trade system.83 The EPA argued that compliance with the cap-and-trade system
79 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 571 F.3d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
80 Id. at 1255-56.
81 Id. at 1256.
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would be sufficient because it would result in greater than RACT-level
emission reductions from state sources.
The D.C. Circuit found that this provision of the cap-and-trade system
violated the RACT requirements of section 172(c)(1) of the Clean Air Act
because there was no guarantee that all nonattainment areas would achieve
RACT level reductions. 4 The preamble to the EPA cap-and-trade CAIR Phase
2 Rule stated that it is likely that the region subject to the program would
achieve a beyond-RACT degree of control. 85 The EPA argued that this greater
regional reduction satisfies the "in the area" language of section 172(c)(1).
Further, the EPA stated that it expected sources subject to the cap-and-trade
program to collectively achieve beyond-RACT reductions in emissions and that
"most" sources would opt to install control technology rather than purchasing
emissions allowances because the former option is cheaper.86
The court determined that this expectation did not satisfy the "in the
area" language because it did not guarantee that each individual nonattainment
area within the region would satisfy the RACT requirement of the Clean Air
Act and achieve attainment of air quality standards. The court contrasted actual
pollution reduction with the avoidance of reduction by purchasing tradable
credits, where "[e]ven if most sources in a nonattainment area installed controls
rather than purchasing allowances, a small number of sources purchasing
allowances and increasing emissions could mean that overall emissions from
sources in the area remained unchanged or even increased., 87 It is possible that
each area will achieve RACT-level reductions but it is not guaranteed that each
area will, which is what the Clean Air Act requires.
The court also discounted the EPA's attempt to rely on the language in
section 172(c)(6) of the Clean Air Act to justify its action. Section 172(c)(6)
requires SIPs to include emission control measures and lists "auctions of
emission rights" as an acceptable measure available to states to achieve
attainment. 88 The EPA argued that the NOx SIP Call system is consistent with
this express authorization of auctions.89 The court found that this was an
inappropriate interpretation of section 172(c)(6) because this language is
intended to guide state implementation of SIPs; "it does not authorize the EPA
to replace the RACT requirement with a cap-and-trade program.
90
The D.C. Circuit Court again found issue with the trading element of
the cap-and-trade system because it provided the possibility for some
84 Natural Res. Def Council v. EPA, 571 F.3d at 1256.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1257.
87 Id.
88 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(6) (2013).
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nonattainment areas to meet the requirements of the cap-and-trade system but
to violate the 172(c)(1) RACT requirements of the Act. This case suggests that
new cap-and-trade programs may need to be less market friendly in light of the
fact that existing provisions of the Clean Air Act may require sources to install
control measures regardless of how many emission allowances a source has
purchased. "Check."
Again in this case, there are lessons for cap-and-trade regulation. The
Clean Air Act, since the earliest days of 1967, has maintained a structure where
there are more than 250 discrete U.S. regions in which the EPA is mandated by
Congress to control air quality. 91 EPA discretion does not translate to likely or
speculative outcomes, where there are alternatives to achieve goals with more
certainty. The EPA cannot create regulations that provide sources with the
option of avoiding other responsibilities and obligations imposed by the Clean
Air Act, even if the regulations would likely achieve comparable or better
results. An agency cannot speculate that a market equitably distributes
responsibility. And competitive markets are not meant to function equitably
among participant sources, only to function efficiently among those with
market assets. Efficiency of operation does not necessarily translate to equity of
operation consistent with congressional regulatory requirements.
Any cap-and-trade system, whether it is intended to improve air quality
regionally or to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHGs), may not
conflict with other provisions and responsibilities under the Clean Air Act. An
agency may need an express grant of congressional cap-and-trade authority
when the statute does not contemplate it expressly. 92 Wholesale replacement of
other regulatory mandates with a cap-and-trade mechanism cannot be
substituted.
D. Global Warming and Substantial Basis
The Montreal Protocol obligated the United States to reduce its
emissions of hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) over the course of multiple
"stepdown" phases. 93 The United States is required to reduce its HCFC
emissions by 35% by 2004, 65% by 2010, 90% by 2015, 99.5% by 2020 and
100% by 2030.94 In 2003, the EPA issued a final rule creating a cap-and-trade
system that assigned baseline emission allowances to each participating
company on a one-time basis to be used for each of the step-down phases.95
91 42 U.S.C. §§ 7402, 7407.
92 See Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487, 1487 (2012)
(showing that AB 32 in California provided for discretion for a cap-and-trade option for
implementation, if so selected by CARB).
93 See Arkema, Inc. v. EPA, 618 F.3d 1, -3 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
94 Id. at 2.
95 Id. at 4.
[Vol. 117
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The rule allowed companies to trade their allowances with each other
and between regulated HCFCs within the same company, subject to EPA
approval, on an annual or permanent basis.96 The preamble to the rule
explained that permanent transfers of baseline allowances would "permanently
reduce[]" the transferor's quantity of baseline allowances and "permanently
increase[]" the transferee's quantity of baseline allowances for all relevant
periods.97 In 2010, the EPA issued another rule stating that the participating
companies could not permanently trade their allowances for HCFCs within the
same company, but continued to recognize permanent transfers between
companies.98
The petitioners in this case argued that the EPA's former rule allowing
permanent trades conflicted with the new rule proscribing permanent trades,
concluding that the new rule was "arbitrary and capricious" and an
inappropriate, retroactive action. 99 The EPA countered by arguing that the two
rules did not conflict with one another because the EPA never intended inter-
company transfers of allowances to be permanent, and even if the agency did
change its policy, the EPA adequately explained the policy shift. 00
The main issue in this case was whether the EPA intended all
permanent transfers to extend beyond subsequent step-down phases, or if the
EPA intended the transfers to last only until the next phase began. The court
found that the EPA did allow permanent transfers of inter-company allowances
to extend beyond the subsequent step-down phases, despite the EPA's
argument that it was the author of the regulations and it knew what it said. 1
The D.C. Circuit cited a transfer form that allowed the transfer of "current year
allowances" and "baseline year allowances."' 0 2 The petitioners filed this form
with the EPA indicating that they were transferring allowances for the baseline
year and the EPA approved these transfers in a series of "Non-Objection
Notices."'
10 3
According to the court, this evinced the EPA's intent for transfers of
"baseline year allowances" to extend through to the remaining step-down
periods. 10 4 The court substantiates this conclusion by referring to letters the
EPA sent to the petitioners that provided tables illustrating the companies'
96 Id. at 4-5.
97 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Allowance System for Controlling HCFC Production,
Import and Export, 68 Fed. Reg. 2820, 2835 (Jan. 21, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82).
98 Arkema, 618 F.3d at 5.
99 Id. at 6.
"0 Id. at 6-7.
101 Id. at 9.
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baseline allowances, which reflected as permanent the baseline trades already
approved by the EPA.'0 5 The court states that these letters also evince the
EPA's intent to recognize baseline trades in perpetuity. 0 6 In light of the court's
conclusion, the EPA's new rule operated retroactively in contradiction of its
original rule and as such, was impermissible.10 7 The court upheld other aspects
of the trading system in this cap-and-trade program by striking another of the
EPA's actions that fell outside the scope of its authority. The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals invalidated the EPA's retroactive application of the cap-and-
trade regulation for HCFCs.'° 8
While this case does not address the legal substance of a cap-and-trade
program, its outcome validates the claims of, and favors, source emitters. The
EPA's explanation of its actions does not operate to validate those actions and
does not create greater agency license. Under systems allowing sources to
permanently trade baseline allowances, sources would not need to adopt more
efficient technologies or conform to lower emissions standards for a number of
years, effectively maintaining or nominally reducing pollution levels for a
longer period of time.
E. CSAPR and Federalist Lines "Down the Rabbit Hole"
After CAIR cap-and-trade was stricken in 2008 by the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, the EPA issued and substituted the Cross-State Air Pollution
Rule (CSAPR) addressing interstate air transport of SO2 and NO, contributing
to ground-level ozone and fine particle pollution from fossil fuel-fired power
plants in 27 eastern states.' 0 9 The Clean Air Act affords states a period of time
to submit a new or revised SIP after the EPA sets emission standards.1 0 If the
state fails to submit a timely or sufficient SIP, the EPA may enforce a Federal
Implementation Plan (FIP)."' CSAPR imposed an FIP on the states before they
could file an SIP and have it reviewed as to adequacy. 12 The EPA argued that
105 Id. at 8.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 9.
108 Id. at 1.
109 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2013); Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of
Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,216
(Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified as 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, and 97); see also Cross-State Air
Pollution Rule, supra note 38; supra note 38 and accompanying text.
11o 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).
"1 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1)(A).
112 EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Critics of
CSAPR suggested that the rule was passed too quickly and that it illustrated the EPA's "unusual
sense of urgency, even at the expense of procedural obligations under the [Clean Air Act] and the
Administrative Procedures Act .... Margaret Campbell & Byron Kirkpatrick, The Cross-State
Air Pollution Rule and EPA 's Rush to Regulate, 43 No. 3 ABA TRENDs 6 (2012).
[Vol. 117
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states are obligated to comply with National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) and the "good neighbor" provision simultaneously, and that the
regulated states had failed to submit an appropriate SIP, entitling the EPA to
enforce an FIP.113
The D.C. Circuit Court found the EPA's argument flawed because the
"good neighbor" provision requires the EPA to determine a state's reduction
obligation before requiring the state to comply with it. 114 States are not
obligated to submit an SIP illustrating how they plan to comply with an
emission standard before the EPA determines what that standard is. By finding
that the states had failed to file a sufficient SIP to comply with their obligations
under CSAPR, the EPA attempted to define "the target after the States' chance
to comply with the target ha[d] already passed."'"15 The Clean Air Act allows
the federal government to set national standards but it allows states the right to
choose the means by which they attain those standards. 16 The court concluded
that the EPA crossed this federalism barrier by forcing states by default to
conform to an FIP without giving them the opportunity to file an SIP.
The court also struck CSAPR because of its flawed method for
determining the emission reduction obligation imposed on states. To first
establish if a state would be subject to CSAPR, the EPA determined if
"downwind areas that EPA modeling predicted would not attain, or absent
regulation would not maintain, the NAAQS.""' 7 If a state exceeded these
quantitative air quality thresholds, they would be subject to CSAPR. The EPA
then applied a cost-based standard to determine what level of emissions
reduction each regulated upwind state would need to achieve. The cost-based
standard asked "how much pollution each upwind state's power plants could
eliminate if the upwind State's plants applied all controls available at or below
a given cost-per-ton of pollution reduction." 1 8 The cost-per-ton did not take
into consideration how much pollution each upwind state contributed to each
downwind state, as determined in the first step. 19
The circuit court did not have a problem with the method for
determining whether an upwind state should be subject to CSAPR.120 However,
the cost-based standard used to determine an upwind state's obligation was
impermissibly flawed, according to the circuit court, because the EPA may not
force a state to reduce its emissions beyond those that significantly contribute
113 EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 32.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 33.
116 Id.
11 Id. at 15.
118 Id. at 16-17.
119 Id. at 17.
.2 Id. at 25.
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to a downwind state's nonattainment or those that interfere with the
maintenance of a downwind state's attainment."' By forcing all contributing
upwind states to impose all control measures within the cost-per-ton-of-
pollution standard, the EPA was forcing states to reduce insignificant
emissions-emissions that did not significantly contribute to a downwind
state's nonattainment or maintenance of attainment. 1
22
The court also found that CSAPR forced upwind states to share the
burden of other upwind states' significant contributions downwind.123 The D.C.
Circuit stated that "the 'significance' of each upwind State's contribution
cannot be measured in a vacuum, divorced from the impact of the other upwind
States. Rather, the collective burden must be allocated among the upwind
States in proportion to the size of their contributions to the downwind State's
nonattainment." 1
2 4
By not providing a basis for proportionally triaging each upwind state's
contribution, CSAPR forced upwind states to impermissibly bear responsibility
for other states' violations of the "good neighbor" provision. 125 The court did
determine that the EPA was afforded some discretion when defining each
state's proportional reduction obligation. 126 After the court reemphasized that
the EPA has a duty to "ratchet back" the upwind states' obligations if it
determines that the collective reductions of upwind states would reduce
emissions beyond what is necessary for downwind states to attain NAAQS, the
D.C. Circuit acknowledged that this proportionality may not always be possible
and that the EPA was entitled to some leniency on this issue.
27
Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit Court struck this latest Clean Air Act cap-
and-trade mechanism developed by the EPA after, again, finding that the EPA
had acted outside the scope of its authority. 28 The D.C. Circuit struck the
CSAPR, in part, because it did not defer to SIPs and state discretion
in implementation under the federalism split authority of the Clean Air Act.
129
121 Id. at 26.
122 Id. at 20.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 20-21.
125 Id. at 13.
126 Id. at 19.
127 Id. at 22. One of the criticisms of this opinion is that it does not craft an acceptable rule for
the EPA to follow. See Bryan Dooley, Note, EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA: The
Search for Meaningful Regulation of Interstate Pollution Under the Clean Air Act, 14 MINN. J.L.
Sci. & TECH. 893, 918 (2013). It merely states that CSAPR goes too far while acknowledging
that it is impractical for the EPA to create perfectly proportional obligations, without indicating
what it would accept as a happy medium between CSAPR and CAIR. Id.
128 EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 37.
129 Id. at 12. While employing a different mechanism than CAIR to address cross-state
pollution, the court found that it required some states to reduce emissions by more than they
[Vol. 117
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By imposing an FIP before states had the opportunity to submit an SIP, the
EPA violated fundamental principles of federalism.
1 30
The EPA also, according to the circuit court, misinterpreted the Clean
Air Act by requiring states to reduce emissions beyond their significant
proportional contribution to downwind states' nonattainment. The court took a
"hard look" and held that one level of government cannot cross the federalist
line of its jurisdiction "down the rabbit hole." '131 The EPA asked the Supreme
Court for certiorari, and was opposed in this motion by 14 states, while nine
states supported certiorari.1 32 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
33
In a 6-2 opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's
holding in April 2014, reaffirming deference to agency discretion in devising
Clean Air Act regulations, as per Chevron. The Court noted that "[t]he statute
therefore calls upon the Agency to address a thorny causation problem: How
should EPA allocate among multiple contributing upwind States responsibility
for a downwind State's excess pollution?"' 134 The Court allowed the EPA
leeway to devise its air control scheme for interstate cross-state pollution.
135
The majority opinion denominates the allocation choices the EPA made as
"sensible," "equitable," "efficient" and "mak[ing] good sense,"'136 citing
Chevron. 1
37
The Court concluded that the EPA must give states a reasonable
opportunity to allocate their emission budgets before issuing FIPs. 138 The Clean
contributed to downwind state pollution. Id. at 25. Fifteen states sought review of CSAPR, while
six states intervened to support the rule. See id. at 9-10.
130 For a similar holding of the Fifth Circuit on EPA deference to SIPs, see Texas v. EPA, 690
F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2012). For a contrary view of the D.C. Circuit, see Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180
(D.C. Cir. 2013).
131 EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d. at 33.
132 EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d 7, petition for cert.filed, 2013 WL 1309078 (Mar.
29, 2013) (No. 12-1182).
133 See EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d 7, cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (June 24,
2013) (No. 12-1182).
134 EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1604 (2014).
135 Id. at 1590.
136 Id. at 1594 ("[C]urtailing interstate air pollution poses a complex challenge for
environmental regulators.... The overlapping and interwoven linkages between upwind and
downwind States with which EPA had to contend number in the thousands.... Rather, as the
gases emitted by upwind polluters are carried downwind, they are transformed, through various
chemical processes, into altogether different pollutants. The offending gases at issue in these
cases-nitrogen oxide (NOx) and sulfur dioxide (S0 2)-often develop into ozone and fine
particulate matter (PM2 .5) by the time they reach the atmospheres of downwind States.").
137 Under Chevron, Congress's silence effectively delegates authority to the EPA to select
from among reasonable options. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). The
EPA's chosen allocation method was held to be a "permissible construction of the statute."
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
138 EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. at 1588.
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Air Act was held to mandate SIP compliance with the "good neighbor"
provision, which requires SIPs to "'contain adequate provisions...
prohibiting... any source or other type of emissions activity within the State
from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will . . . contribute
significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other
State with respect to any... [NAAQS]."",139 The plain text was held to support
the federal agency disapproval of an SIP, which without more, triggers the
EPA's obligation to issue an FIP.
The Supreme Court's dissenting opinion, agreeing with the D.C.
Circuit Court majority, concluded that "[t]oo many important decisions of the
Federal Government are made nowadays by unelected agency officials
exercising broad lawmaking authority, rather than by the people's
representatives in Congress. . . . Today, the majority approves [an]
undemocratic revision of the Clean Air Act.
140
Integrating elements of the D.C. Circuit's concern, the government
must exercise some care not to impose a sanction in advance of going through
the appropriate administrative process to arrive at the standard. This would
become an important element in the upcoming future challenge to the
California carbon control legislation.14 1 There also is an interesting thread in
these court decisions of ensuring that an institution of government treats all
states fairly. It is based on congressional intent under the Clean Air Act, rather
than constitutional requirements for states not to discriminate against each
other's commerce, which would surface in later challenges to California cap-
and-trade regulation.
142
The federalism line, demarcating state and federal power to administer
environmental laws, is an important new subtext to many of these battles. As
adjudicated in the D.C. Circuit, CSAPR exceeded the EPA's procedural
authority and violated cooperative federalism because it ignored express
language in the Clean Air Act which affords states a reasonable opportunity to
design and submit an SIP before being subjected to an FIP. The D.C. Circuit
Court, but not the Supreme Court majority, also found that CSAPR regulated
too extensively and concluded that the EPA only has the regulatory authority to
follow the language of the Clean Air Act exactly, no more and no less. The
Supreme Court showed more deference to the agency's exercise of
discretionary regulation.
The Clean Air Act scheme has been interpreted "as erecting a statutory
federalism bar" that "prohibits EPA from using the SIP process to force States
to adopt specific control measures.' 43 If an SIP would result in compliance
"' Id. at 1595 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i) (2006)).
140 Id. at 1610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141 See infra Part III.B-C.
142 See infra Part IV.A.
143 EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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with EPA standards, the EPA may not question the choices of the state as to
how it complies with them. 144 Moreover, the EPA cannot condition its approval
of SIPs on the adoption of specific control measures by states. 145 States have
the "first-implementer role,"'146 while the EPA "is relegated ... to a secondary
role.' 47 Again, "checkmate."
This federalism line has emerged recently as the critical legal metric in
the context of a variety of recent legal challenges to state sustainable energy
and carbon control measures.148 Its parallel echo here in the enforcement of
state and federal Clean Air Act obligations is interesting. In these air
regulations, it was the federal government which was found to have exceeded
its authority in compelling state action. 149 This reflects the split federal-state
authority written into the text of the Clean Air Act.
By contrast, the federalism issue in sustainable energy and carbon
control regulation has, in a majority of cases, found an excessive degree of state
regulation of energy commerce pursuant to both state administrative procedural
requirements and the Constitution of the United States. These state procedural
excesses have quicker and more procedural remedies of reissuing state
regulations in conformance with state procedural law. To date, they have set
back the implementation of state regulation by a year. 150 However, the
constitutional challenges raise even more profound issues. They are not
violations of procedure, but allege fundamental exceedance of limits on state
power to exercise or discriminate in the exercise of regulation of commerce.
These are discussed more in Sections III and IV, where the state administrative
challenges and the constitutional challenges are examined.
F. 2012 and 2013: Cooperative Air Federalism
There are two different federal courts of appeal which have rendered
decisions on the line between state and federal power to impose air regulation
on new or modified pollution sources. The two decisions are not in sync.
In Texas v. EPA, a 2012 decision, the Fifth Circuit reversed the EPA's
decision to reject an SIP revision submitted by Texas because the EPA
infringed on the state's discretionary authority established by the Clean Air
Act's inherent federalism principles.' 51 The Flexible Permit Program was
submitted by Texas to the EPA as a revision to the Texas SIP and as a new
144 Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975).
145 Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1401-10 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
146 EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 28.
147 Id. at 29 (quoting Train, 421 U.S. at 79).
148 See infra Parts III, IV.A.
149 See supra Part ILE; EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 25-28.
151 See infra Part III.B.
151 Texas v. EPA, 690 F.3d 670, 686 (5th Cir. 2012).
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feature of the state's Minor New Source Review (NSR) procedure.152 Under
this program, when a source was modified, it could avoid any new regulatory
review as long as the source's increased emissions did not exceed a cap
specified by the permit.
153
The Clean Air Act requires all SIPs to contain NSR procedures for
allocating pre-construction permits for all new or modified pollution sources.
154
The Act distinguishes between major and minor pollution sources, requiring
more stringent standards for major sources than for minor sources. 155 The EPA
did not approve the Texas program because it would allow major sources of
pollution to avoid Major NSR.1 6
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding that the EPA's interpretation of the
SIP was not authoritative and that the program did in fact require major sources
to comply with Major NSR.157 The state has very broad discretion, within the
Clean Air Act, to prescribe all of the detailed "micro" level choices through
which the SIP achieves its numeric cumulative quantitative targets of air
pollution. 158 The EPA may only deny a state's "micro" choices if the EPA
objectively determines that they "would interfere with any applicable
requirement concerning attainment and reasonable further progress [of
NAAQS] or any other applicable requirement."' 159 In other words, the state has
discretion to determine how and where it achieves air quality standards, with
the EPA only exercising its power with regard to this same issue if the means
chosen by the state will not timely achieve the required quantitative federal air
quality value. The court stressed that a state's authority allocated by the
cooperative federalism within the Clean Air Act "would be hollow indeed if the
state were not even responsible for its own sentence structure."' 
60
The EPA also disapproved of the Texas program's monitoring, records-
keeping and recording (MRR) provisions, stating that they conferred too much
discretion to the state and that they were vague and not replicable.161 The EPA
unsuccessfully argued that the Clean Air Act does not authorize this type of
"director discretion" and that this implementation was "too vague and not
152 Id. at 676.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 674.
155 Id. at 674-75.
156 Id. at 677. The Texas program did not expressly state that it did not apply to major sources.
Id.
157 Id. at 677-78.
158 See STEPHEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 187 (5th ed. 2010).
159 42 U.S.C. § 7410(1) (2013).
160 Texas v. EPA, 690 F.3d at 679.
161 Id. at 681. The program allowed Texas to insert MRR provisions into each individual
permit as opposed to using a "one-size-fits-all" approach. Id.
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replicable."' 162 Again, the court found that the EPA does not have the authority
to force states to use specific language in its SIPs and that it failed to
adequately show how the director discretion within the program violated the
Clean Air Act.
163
The EPA argued that the program did not provide "objective and
replicable methodologies for establishing emission caps.' 64 Specifically, the
EPA took the position that the method used by Texas to determine emission
caps did not use express language limiting the caps to minor sources and was
not replicable. 165 The court quickly dispatched this argument by revisiting its
previous discussions: the EPA may not force the state to implement particular
language and replicability is not a standard by which the EPA may reject an
sip.
166
In a similar friction between state and federal government, the federal
government was held capable of imposing air regulatory requirements on the
states, if the states do not properly exercise authority under the Clean Air Act.
The Federal D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the EPA's imposition of
FIPs on states that failed to require Prevention of Significant Deterioration
permits for new or modified major stationary sources which emit GHGs.'67
The Clean Air Act delegates the actual sculpting of implementation
decisions to the states, limiting the federal authority from imposing "one-size-
fits-all" uniformity on state determinations of how to meet federal air quality
decisions within their states. The EPA may not violate cooperative federalism
by stepping into the states' dominion. Future cap-and-trade systems might be
voluntary or provide an incentive, so that the EPA does not infringe on the
states' area of regulation. So generally, states get discretion on the details.
However, in the cases discussed above, none of the Clean Air Act
decisions involved states exercising a decision not granted by federal statutes,
and there was no perceived discrimination against interstate commerce. This
poses a distinction from the new round of cap-and-trade litigation surrounding
state carbon control and renewable energy legislation, where state regulation is
162 Id. at 682-83. The EPA suggested that Texas should mimic the MRR language in a similar
federal program to comply with the Clean Air Act. Id. at 684.
163 Id. at 682-84. The court noted that the EPA had approved "director discretion" provisions
in other SIPs mere months before rejecting the same provision in the Texas program. Id. at 682-
83. As such, the EPA was not allowed to reject an SIP for containing the same provision it had
recently approved. Id. at 683. The EPA had a third ground for rejecting the Texas program that
largely mimics their argument for the first two grounds. Id. at 684-85.
'64 Id. at 685.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 685-86.
167 Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180 (D.C. Cir. 2013). While the challenge was dismissed on
standing grounds, it distinguished the environmental regulation from the higher concern on
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driven from independent state law or triggers constitutional concerns where
states discriminate against commerce originating in other states, as next
addressed.1
68
III. CAP-AND-TRADE REGULATORY CHALLENGES TO STATE CARBON
CONTROL
States also recently have enacted cap-and-trade regulation focused on
regulating climate-warming gas emissions in the state. The Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 16 9 and California's Assembly Bill (AB) 32
carbon regulation program 170 both adopted cap-and-trade programs. RGGI in
originally seven, eventually ten, and now nine, eastern states, regulates its cap-
and-trade allowances only for CO 2 emissions from power plants.'
17 California's
AB 32 regulates all carbon emissions from all major industries in 
the state. 172
RGGI is more limited than California in covered entities and industries, the
kinds of GHG emissions controlled, and the amount of emissions targeted and
controlled: RGGI controls just CO2 while California controls all six GHGs;
RGGI controls just larger electric generation facilities while California
controls, in three phases, electric generation and all other larger industrial
emitters of GHGs, including transportation fuels.
This state regulation is similar to federal cap-and-trade regulations in
that both involve air regulation. Air moves, and both RGGI and California
carbon credits are tradable. 173 However, while conventional "criteria" air
pollution regulated by the federal and state governments causes problems in
proximity to that pollution, GHG emissions have no specific local impact and
have a universal warming impact. A molecule of GHG released anywhere in
the world has identical impact on climate change, regardless of where it is
released, as pointed out by experts to the Ninth Circuit.
174
168 See infra Part III.
169 Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 29.
170 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501 (2014).
171 REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, GOALS, PROPOSED TASKS, SHORT-TERM ACTION ITEMS
1 (2003), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/actionplanfinal.pdf.
172 See Assembly Bill 32 Overview, AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
173 See AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, APPENDIX J: ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION J-5
(2010) [hereinafter ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION], available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/
regact/2010/capandtradel0/capv4appj.pdf, REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, REG'L
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE MODEL RULE 4, 38-40 (Dec. 31, 2008), available at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/Model%20Rule%2ORevised%2012.31.08.pdf.
174 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Ken Caldeira et al. in Support of Defendants-Appellants at 27,
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (Nos. 12-
15131, 12-15135) ("Greenhouse gas emissions contribute to the problem of global climate
change wherever they are emitted."). The majority opinion of the Ninth Circuit concedes that
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A. California's AB 32 Carbon Control
California is the twelfth largest GHG producer in the world.
175
California's carbon emissions are greater than two-thirds of the Annex I
developed nations regulated under the Kyoto Protocol. AB 32, the California
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (GWSA), requires the California Air
Resources Board (CARB) to develop a comprehensive plan to reduce GHG
emissions in the state to its historic 1990 levels by the year 2020.176 This
equates to an eventual estimated 25% to 29% reduction from business-as-usual
GHG emission levels. 177 The GWSA sets a target of reducing statewide
emissions to 427 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO2 E)
of GHGs by the year 2020, and highlights reduction measures that were
adopted in 2011 to meet this goal.' 78 California's goal was based on projections
that it was on pace to emit 507 or more MMTCO2 E by 2020.1"9
CARB is designated in the statute as the state agency "charged with
monitoring and regulating sources of GHG emissions in order to reduce those
emissions."' 80 Among regulatory options available, CARB chose to implement
a cap-and-trade system for GHGs, as opposed to a carbon fee or carbon tax to
implement the statute. California's comprehensive cap-and-trade program,
prior to lawsuits which delayed it,' 8' was to commence in 2012.
The scientific scope of GHG emissions regulated by California is
broad, regulating multiple gases. 8 2 California regulates GHG emissions from
"[o]ne ton of carbon dioxide emitted when fuel is produced in Iowa or Brazil harms Californians
as much as one emitted when fuel is consumed in Sacramento." Rocky Mountain Farmers Union
v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013).
175 CAL. ENERGY COMM'N & CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, PROPOSED FINAL OPINION SUMMARY
ON GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATORY STRATEGIES 2 (Sept. 2008), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2008publications/CEC- 100-2008-004/CEC- 100-2008-004.PDF.
176 Assembly Bill 32 Overview, supra note 172. California's GWSA was signed into law by
Governor Schwarzenegger on September 27, 2006.
177 PROPOSED FINAL OPINION SUMMARY, supra note 175, at 1; AIR RES. BD., CAL ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, FACTS ABOUT CALIFORNIA GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS INVENTORY (Jan. 2, 2009),
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/ghginv.pdf.
178 See PROPOSED FINAL OPINION SUMMARY, supra note 175, at 1.
179 Id.; see AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STATUS OF SCOPING PLAN
RECOMMENDED MEASURES 1 (last visited Nov. 19, 2014), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/
scopingplan/status of scoping.plan-measures.pdf.
180 AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM RES. 12-33 (Sept.
20, 2012), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/res 12-33.pdf.
181 See infra Part III.B.4.
182 CAL. CODE OF REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(123) (2012).
"Emissions" means the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere from
sources and processes in a facility, including from the combustion of
transportation fuels such as natural gas, petroleum products, and natural gas
liquids. In the context of offsets, "emissions" means the release of
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all aspects of its economy, not just power generators. 83 Electric generators are
required to meet a CO2 emissions level no greater than that achievable by a
combined-cycle, gas-fired generator.1
84
The program establishes a declining limit on approximately 85% of the
state's total GHG emissions, declining over time to reach its goal. The program
covers about 350 businesses with 600 facilities in the first phase. "Covered
sources" must surrender "compliance instruments" to CARB that are equal to
their GHG emissions. 85 Covered entities can acquire allowances or purchase
them. The entity must retire compliance credits or instruments equal to 30% of
its annual emissions by November 1 of the following year, with the balance of
70% "trued-up" for a multi-year compliance period.
The CARB system creates two types of tradable compliance
instruments to meet the cap: allowances 187 and offsets. 188 One can obtain an
allowance allocation from CARB, purchase allowances at auction, or purchase
them from miscellaneous dealers legally on the secondary market. 89 In the first
compliance period, approximately 90% of allowances to meet the cap are
allocated free of charge to regulated entities. 190 California administers an
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere from sources and processes within an
offset project boundary."
Id.
183 Assembly Bill 32 Overview, supra note 172.
184 See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 8340-8341 (2007). Any new contracts for a term of five
years or more for the procurement of "Baseload" generation is defined as electricity generation
that is designed and intended to operate at an annualized plant capacity factor of 60% or greater.
Baseload generation must comply with a performance standard of emitting no more than 1100
pounds C0 2/MWh emitted from power generation. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8340(a). This is a
level that conventional coal-fired electric generation will not be able to meet, generating about
1770 pounds C0 2/MWh. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8340(a); Seth Hilton, The Impact of
California's Global Warming Legislation on the Electric Utility Industry, 19 THE ELECTRICITY J.
10, 10-16 (2006).
185 AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHAPTER 1: How DOES THE CAP-AND-TRADE
PROGRAM WORK? 12 (2012) [hereinafter How DOES THE CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM WORK?],
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/ chapterl .pdf.
186 CAL. CODE OF REGS. tit. 17, § 94812(b) (2012).
187 How DOES THE CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM WORK?, supra note 185, at 12. Allowances
issued by CARB deliver the right to emit one metric ton of carbon. Id.
188 Id. Offsets can be valid for up to eight years from the date of issuance. CAL. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY: AIR RES. BD., CHAPTER 6: WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR OFFSET CREDITS AND
HOW ARE THEY ISSUED? 47 (Dec. 12, 2012) [hereinafter REQUIREMENTS FOR OFFSET CREDITS],
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/chapter6.pdf.
189 See How DOES THE CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM WORK?, supra note 185, at 14. The first
auction of allowances occurred November 14, 2012. Id. at 16.
190 ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION, supra note 173, at J-67; see also Allowance Allocation, AIR
RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/
capandtrade/allowanceallocation/allowanceallocation.htm.
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emissions allowance declining-sum exercise as the state moves through
compliance periods.' 91
"Offsets" are a key element of most carbon control and cap-and-trade
programs, as well as of several air control regulations. Offsets are tradable
reductions of carbon produced by projects which are not otherwise subject to
the cap-and-trade program, whether in California or another relevant state.
192
Offsets create credits for other carbon reduction by an uncovered entity in
recognized, eligible carbon emissions which can be sold to and used for
compliance by those entities which are regulated.
In California, offsets can be employed to satisfy up to 8% of any
individual covered source's emissions. 193 These offset provisions in the carbon
cap-and-trade program allow these 8% offsets to come from projects located in
the lower 48 states, Canada, or Mexico, which are real, additional, quantifiable,
permanent, verifiable (by a third-party), and enforceable for compliance.
194
There are "early action" offsets for projects reducing emissions from 2005 to
2014.'9' CARB identified four ways to create offset credits: forest projects,
urban tree-planting projects, farming projects designed to manage emissions
from manure, and ozone depleting substances projects. 96
California and the RGGI states, for the first time in history, 197 have
reconfigured this environmental regulation to generate significant revenues for
their states through cap-and-trade with credits auctioned rather than freely
distributed. This auction is justified to prevent windfalls to participating
19t The assistance factor starts at 100% for all industries, but the amount by which it decreases
varies by industry. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95870(e) (2012) (tbl.8-1). For example, sectors
such as pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing and aircraft manufacturing ratchet down to
30% in the third compliance period. Id. Other industries (e.g., crude petroleum and natural gas
extraction, mineral mining, and certain types of manufacturing) deemed particularly susceptible
to "leakage" remain at 100% throughout the program. Id. In addition, the number of allocated
allowances is adjusted downward annually based on an "adjustment factor." CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
17, § 95891(d) (2014) (tbl.9-2). For most industries, the adjustment factor declines from 0.981 in
2013 to 0.851 in 2020. Id. Therefore, California supports extraction of fossil fuel resources of all
kinds by supporting their extraction of resources with donated allocations of allowances. Id. This
may seem somewhat counterintuitive.
192 REQUIREMENTS FOR OFFSET CREDITS, supra note 188, at 1. Offsets are awarded for projects
carried out pursuant to one of four protocols adopted by CARB: U.S. Forestry Projects, Urban
Forest Projects, Livestock Projects, and Ozone Depleting Substances Projects. Id. at 9.
193 Id. at 1.
194 Id. at 8. An offset represents a one MTCO2E reduction from a project in an uncapped
sector. CARB requires that offsets be "real, additional, quantifiable, permanent, verifiable, and
enforceable." CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(328) (2014).
195 REQUIREMENTS FOR OFFSET CREDITS, supra note 188, at 3, 83.
196 AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AN OVERVIEW OF ARB EMISSIONS TRADING
PROGRAM OVERVIEW 1 (Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/
emissionstrading-program.pdf.
197 FERREY, supra note 2, at 82-83.
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emitters. 198 The ten northeast RGGI states raised approximately $1 billion of
RGGI proceeds realized from their auctions in 2009-2011.199 The California
Chamber of Commerce claims that CARB itself projected to raise a total of
$12-$70 billion in California.2 °°
As the law was scheduled to become effective in 2012, California
enacted four pieces of legislation to direct the flow of the substantial auction
revenues which would be raised.20 1 The cost of California carbon credits
advanced in auctions from an initial price of $10.09 in November 2012, to
$13.62 in February 2013, to $14.00 in May 2013.202 Approximately 350
businesses with approximately 590 facilities are required to obtain and
surrender credits to the state in the first phase of the program.
203
It goes without saying that California is different. It is different on cap-
and-trade in that it has enacted a vigorous cap-and-trade statute regulating
global warming gases and climate change. The federal government has not
done so. California's cap-and-trade legislation is different legally in that it has
been challenged as to (1) compliance with state environmental and
administrative law requirements on the agency implementing the statute and (2)
on constitutional violations of the dormant Commerce Clause of the
Constitution. California violations of state environmental and administrative
process laws can be cured by a delay to re-promulgate administrative orders,
regulations, or plans. Federal constitutional violations cannot be cured by state
re-promulgation of similar statutes or regulations. Some of these challenges
have been in state court, and the constitutional violations have been in federal
court.
198 Id. at 191.
199 Id.; see also RGGI Benefits, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/
rggi benefits (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (as determined individually by each state: 65%
efficiency; 17% for direct assistance (welfare assistance); 6% renewable energy; and 6% for
GHG abatement).
200 See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
201 Joint Ruling on Submitted Matters at 3-4, Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res.
Bd., No. 34-2012-80001313 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2013). Senate Bill (SB) 1018 requires that auction
proceeds be deposited in a Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund and authorizes auction funds to be
lent to the State General Fund. Id. at 3. AB 1464 states that the Director of Finance may allocate
or otherwise use an amount of at least $500 million of the funds raised, while making
commensurate reductions to General Fund expenditure authority, for the purpose of advancing
the goals of AB 32. Id. at 4. Governor Brown subsequently requested such a loan of $500 million
in 2013. AB 1532 provides that the uses of funds to be deposited in the Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Fund may be determined after the revenues have been collected, and California SB
535 in 2012 was enacted to require at least 25% of the funds raised from auction of carbon
credits to benefit disadvantaged communities, and a least 10% used for projects in communities
that are identified as disadvantaged. Id. at 4.
202 Carolyn Whetzel, State's Greenhouse Gas Allowances Sell for $14 Per Ton in Third
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B. Cap-and-Trade Scoping Plan Challenge
CARB's scoping plan for selecting the mechanism for implementation
of carbon control in California was challenged by a group representing lower-
income state citizens. In 2011, California lost this suit against its carbon control
cap-and-trade regulation, resulting in an additional year of delay in start of the
entire regulatory program until CARB "[came] into complete compliance with
its obligations" in 2013 and made any revisions to comply with court order on
legal requirements. °4
The petitioners in this original matter were a group of individuals who
joined forces with several non-profit organizations who asked the court for a
writ of mandate. 0 5 The petition alleged specifically that the scoping plan:
(a) fails to achieve the maximum technologically feasible and
cost-effective reductions; (b) fails to require emissions
reduction measures for significant sources of emissions,
namely industrial and agricultural sources; (c) does not develop
any policies to avoid the pitfalls of other greenhouse gas
emission trading programs and fails to address how ARB will
monitor and enforce reductions in a regional market; (d) fails
to assess the likely impacts of proposed policy choices and
regulatory programs and fails to propose policies to ensure that
compliance with chosen measures will not disproportionately
impact already overburdened communities; and (e) fails to
prevent increases in criteria and toxic co-pollutant emissions.0 6
The petitioners argued that CARB violated California's AB 32 by
(1) excluding whole sectors of the economy from GHG
emission controls and including a cap and trade program
without determining whether potential reduction measures
achieved the maximum technologically feasible and cost-
effective reductions; (2) failing to adequately evaluate the total
cost and total benefit to the environment, economy and public
health before adopting the program Scoping Plan; and (3)
failing to consider all relevant information regarding GHG
204 See Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487 (Cal. App. Ct.
2012); Lisa Weinzimer & Geoffrey Craig, Delaying California GHG Cap-and-Trade Regime a
Year Draws Support from Stakeholders, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., July 4, 2011, at 11 -12. The court
issued a writ of mandate enjoining CARB from any further cap-and-trade rulemaking until it had
complied with the CEQA by analyzing alternatives to cap-and-trade and public comments. This
delayed the plan until 2013. Tentative Statement of Decision: Order Granting in Part Petition for
Writ of Mandate, No. CPF-09-509562, 2011 WL 312702 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2011).
205 Tentative Statement of Decision: Order Granting in Part Petition for Writ of Mandate,
supra note 204, at 2.
206 Ass'n of Irritated Residents, 206 Cal. App. 4th at 1493.
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emission reduction programs used throughout the United States
and the World, as required by AB 32, prior to recommending a
cap-and-trade option. 
°7
The suit alleged that CARB did not literally seek "maximum
technologically feasible and cost-effective reductions. ' '  Additionally, the
petitioners claimed that CARB violated the California Environmental Quality
Act (CEQA) in the preparation of its Functional Equivalent Document.2 °9
These claims all contested a failure to comply with required state law
and administrative process, rather than federal or constitutional claims. As to
basic administrative process, the court held that CARB did not abuse its
discretion and was not arbitrary and capricious in making its program
choices. 210 However, the court did find that CARB improperly approved its
Scoping Plan prior to completing the legally required environmental review.21
This suggested a predetermined result apart from reaching a decision through a
legally required comparison of alternatives.212 The court issued a writ of
mandate enjoining CARB from any further cap-and-trade rulemaking until it
complied with CEQA by analyzing alternatives to cap-and-trade and
considered relevant public comments.2 13  This delayed the program
implementation for approximately a year until 2013.214
When re-promulgated a year later in 2012 with a more robust
consideration of alternatives, CARB's Climate Change Scoping Plan and
choice of the previous cap-and-trade option was upheld by a state court.215 The
207 Tentative Statement of Decision: Order Granting in Part Petition for Writ of Mandate,
supra note 204, at 2-3.
208 Ass'n of Irritated Residents, 206 Cal. App. 4th at 1496. The court acknowledged
California's emissions goal for 2020 was stated in terms of "million metric tons of CO2 emitted"
(MMTCO 2E), seeking a reduction from 596 MMTCO 2E to the 1990 level of 427 MMTCO2E.
Even though CARB modified the goal to reduce another five MMTCO 2E as a "margin of safety"
(to account for uncapped sectors of the California economy), the Association of Irritated
Residents argued that CARB still failed to meet its mandate, again citing the AB 32 Call for
"maximum" feasible reductions. Id. at 1497.
209 Id. at 1493. This alleged that CEQA was violated by "(1) failing to adequately analyze the
impacts of the measures described in the Scoping Plan; (2) failing to adequately analyze
alternatives to the Scoping Plan; and (3) impermissibly approving and implementing the Scoping
Plan prior to completing its environmental review." Tentative Statement of Decision: Order
Granting in Part Petition for Writ of Mandate, supra note 204, at 2-3.
210 Tentative Statement of Decision: Order Granting in Part Petition for Writ of Mandate,
supra note 204, at 3.
211 Id. at 31-33.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 33.
214 See Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487 (Cal. App. Ct.
2012).
215 Id. at 1506.
[Vol. 117
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court resolved very subjective issues of whether CARB was arbitrary and
capricious in its choices, provided substantial evidence to support its decisions,
and considered alternatives. 216 The state appeals court found that the California
legislature intended to provide broad discretion to CARB and that CARB had
not acted arbitrarily nor capriciously.217 So, this temporarily successful state
law challenge did not change the ultimate result; however, it required the
California state agency to reinitiate that choice employing the correct
administrative process. Note, again, these were all state law claims as to
administrative process, whereunder states can redo the process or amend the
statute and achieve similar ultimate outcomes to those originally proposed.
C. Cap-and-Trade Auction Litigation
The California decision to implement an auction process for allowance
distribution, raising money from the auction of allowances to covered entities
to emit carbon, was challenged by the California Chamber of Commerce.218
The California Chamber of Commerce filed a lawsuit at the end of 2012
seeking to invalidate the cap-and-trade auction scheme under AB 32.219 The
complaint asserted that AB 32 does not authorize CARB to impose fees other
than those needed to cover the ordinary administrative costs of implementing a
state emissions regulatory program.22 °
The California Chamber of Commerce claims that CARB itself
projected to raise a total of $12-$70 billion, which is well in excess of that
necessary to regulate the conduct of the entities paying the fees.221 CARB
argued that the revenue raised from auctioning allowances under the cap-and-
trade program is not a tax but a "regulatory fee," which by law must be relative
in amount to the burden placed on the payer and must be spent on programs
that are related to the specific goal of the program of reducing GHG emissions,
rather than for other fiscal purposes. 2 2 The California Chamber, in its
complaint, alleged:
216 Id. at 1502.
217 id. at 1506.
218 See Cal. Air Res. Bd. v. Cal. Chamber of Commerce, No. 34-2012-80001313 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 2013). The issuance and oversight of offsets has been performed by private parties, including
the Climate Action Reserve.
219 Id. at 2.
220 Id. at 5.
221 Id.
222 Isaac v. City of L.A., 66 Cal. App. 4th 586, 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). To constitute
"regulatory fees" rather than taxes, "fees must not exceed the reasonable cost of the services
necessary for the activity for which the fees are charged and for carrying out the purpose of the
regulation; they may not be levied for unrelated purposes." Id.
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[T]he total silence in AB 32's legislative history regarding any
large-scale grant of fee or tax raising authority to CARB-and
the contradictory concession made by CARB itself-is further
evidence supporting the conclusion that AB 32 did not grant
the CARB any authority to impose fees/taxes beyond that
necessary to cover ordinary administrative expense.
A separate, subsequent 2013 suit brought by different plaintiffs
challenged the California GHG allowance auctions under its emissions cap-
and-trade program as an illegal unconstitutional tax or fee224 and raised similar
concerns to the California Chamber of Commerce litigation.225 The Morning
Star Packing Co. litigation added explicit examples of how the alleged
unconstitutional tax is causing parties to bear increased costs and expenses.226
Morning Star Packing argued that the auction revenues cannot be
characterized as valid regulatory fees, because the revenues are not limited to
the reasonable costs of any regulatory program.227 It further asserted that
CARB has not established any reasonable relationship between the revenues
generated by bids made at auction and either the regulatory burdens posed by
auction bidders or the benefits auction bidders receive from the regulatory
program, and that the cap-and-trade regulation does not prohibit the revenue
from being used for purposes that are unrelated to the regulatory program.228 It
also argued that the cap-and-trade regulation is ultra vires because AB 32
223 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Verified Petition for Writ of
Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 17, Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air
Res. Bd., No. 34-2012-80001313, (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.calchamber.com/governmentrelations/documents/filed_mpa_l 1-13-12.pdf.
"Concession" alludes to a letter by AB 32 author Fabian Nunez, in which Nunez stated his intent
"that any funds provided by Health and Safety Code Section 38597 are to be used solely for the
direct costs incurred in administering this division." Id. at 16 n. 17.
224 Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Morning Star
Packing Co. v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. 34-2013-80001464 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2013),
available at http://www.pacificlegal.org/document.docid=836. The suit asks the court to declare
that "the auction and revenue generating provisions" of the cap-and-trade regulation are
unconstitutional under Proposition 13, the ballot initiative that requires a two-thirds vote on
taxes, or under Proposition 26, a ballot initiative requiring a super-majority vote on some fees
and levies. AB 32 did not pass on a two-thirds vote, nor did SB 1018, AB 1532, SB 535, and AB
1463, which stipulate how the auction revenues must be spent. Id. at 15-20. Plaintiff, Morning
Star Packing, participated in CARB's two prior auctions, spending $379,860 on allowances. Id.
at 2-3.
225 See supra notes 222-24.
226 Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 3-8,
Morning Star Packing Co., No. 2013-80001464.
227 Petitioners' and Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion
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neither explicitly nor implicitly authorizes CARB to generate billions of dollars
of revenues for California by selling emission allowances at auction.22 9
The state court, in August 2013, tentatively allowed CARB to auction
allowances under AB 32.230 From the bench, the judge indicated that if the
California precedent of Sinclair Paint applied to AB 32, it was an illegal tax. l
In November 2013, there was a trial court decision which called it a close call
but allowed the auctioning of allowances.232
D. In-State "Additionality" Discretion
Offsets are an alternative means to achieve compliance with cap-and-
trade carbon regulation, allowing lower-cost reduction opportunities outside the
capped state to be pursued and monetized as tradable credits applied in
California. The quid pro quo for offsets has been the requirement for
"additionality., 233 A 2012 lawsuit in California by advocates for low-income
interests attacked the California climate control legislation on the basis that its
compliance requirements would be met principally by offsets from out-of-state
or even international locations without any assurance that the offsets would be
"additional" to business-as-usual policies in California.234 Plaintiffs argued that
the regulation was ultra vires to the administrative power of CARB, whose
actions were arbitrary and capricious and not based on a solid administrative
record.235 The California trial court in 2013 rejected both arguments,236
229 Id. at 18-19.
230 Joint Tentative Decision and Order for Appearances at 7, Cal. Chamber of Commerce v.
Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. 34-2012-80001313 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 28, 2013).
231 Carolyn Whetzel, Court Upholds California's Authority To Auction Greenhouse Gas
Allowances, 44 ENV'T REP. 2658 (2013).
232 Joint Ruling on Submitted Matters, Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No.
34-2012-80001313 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Nov. 12, 2013), available at http://blog.pacificlegal.org/
wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/1 1/DECISION 111413.pdf.
233 "Additionality" is the requirement in most carbon control statutes or regulations that only
"additional" or non-business-as-usual carbon-reduction projects legally qualify to create carbon
"offsets," "which are tradable credits for compliance with these carbon policies." UNLOCKING
THE GLOBAL WARMING TOOLBOX, supra note 3, at 204; see also RGGI MODEL RULE 106 (Jan. 5,
2007), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/model-rule_ corrected 1_5 07.pdf; PERVAZE A.
SHEIKH & Ross W. GORTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34634, CLIMATE CHANGE AND
INTERNATIONAL DEFORESTATION: LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS CRS-5 tbl. 1 (2008).
234 Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Citizens
Climate Lobby & Our Children's Earth Found. v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CGC-12-5195944 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://ggucuel.org/wp-content/uploads/3 28_12_Cal_
GHGComplaint.pdf.
235 id.
236 The court concluded that plaintiffs had "failed to demonstrate that the Legislature
foreclosed the use of standardized additionality mechanisms or demonstrate that [CARB] acted
arbitrarily or capriciously in promulgating additionality standards." Statement of Decision Re:
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deferring to CARB's expertise and experience and demurring to CARB's
methodology for offsets.
E. The State Law Liquid Fuel/Ethanol Challenge
The purpose of the low carbon fuel standard (LCFS), an element of AB
32,238 is "to implement a low carbon fuel standard, which will reduce GHG
emissions by reducing the full fuel-cycle, carbon intensity of the transportation
fuel used in California., 23 9 The LCFS rule is to reduce the carbon content of
transportation fuels sold in California by 10% by the year 2020 from the year
2010 baseline.240 In a case distinct from a somewhat similar suit on the merits
by other parties under constitutional principles in federal court,241 the largest
ethanol producer in the United States challenged the LCFS rule in California
state court, alleging a failure to comply with the CEQA.242 Plaintiff Poet, LLC
challenged the LCFS regulations on the grounds that CARB violated the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and CEQA during the adoption
process.243 California was found to have violated both statutes.244
The GWSA required the LCFS program to be entirely in force by
January 1, 2010.245 The trial court found against the challengers. 246 On appeal,
the plaintiffs contended that CARB violated the APA by excluding certain
emails from consultants from the rulemaking file made available to the
public. 247 The appellate court held that California had, in fact, violated CEQA
and the California APA by approving the regulation before the required review
Petition for Writ of Mandate at 34, Citizens Climate Lobby & Our Children's Earth Found., No.
CGC-12-519544.
237 Id. at 33.
238 For a discussion of AB 32 see supra Part III.A. For more detail on the LCFS see infra Part
IV.A.
239 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480 (2014).
240 Id. §§ 95480-95490.
241 See infra Part IV.A.
242 Poet, LLC v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 218 Cal. App. 4th 681, 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). Poet
argued that CARB failed to respond to numerous public comments, that it omitted documents
from the rulemaking file, and that the LCFS will lead to increased GHG emissions, not the
reductions it promises. Id. at 698. Poet alleged that CARB's LCFS rule exceeds the scope of
authority delegated to it by the legislature. Id. at 727.
243 Id. at 698.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 697.
246 Id. at 709.
247 Id. at 741; Summary of November 20, 2013 Conference Report for Civil Cases, AT THE
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under CEQA.248 The court also found that CARB had improperly deferred
formulating required mitigation measures. 249 However, after ruling against the
state, the court refrained from enjoining the regulation under state law °.25 The
public was directed to submit comments about remedies for these violations.25'
At the end of 2013, the California Supreme Court denied CARB's
request to review overturning the appellate court decision that CARB had
improperly promulgated the LCFS program. 2  So this finding of LCFS
illegality is final. Coupled with the Rocky Mountain253 challenge to the LCFS,
this renders the majority of courts at trial and appellate levels and the majority
of judges who heard litigation challenges to the LCFS cap-and-trade program
to have ruled it to be illegal. The full court did not muster a majority for an
appeal en banc.254
F. New York Cap-and-Trade Regulation Implementing RGGI Carbon
Control
There was a successful suit in 2010 against New York's RGGI cap-
and-trade carbon regulation.255 The RGGI commenced in January 2009 in
originally seven and eventually ten northeastern states.256 CO 2 emissions from
248 Poet, LLC, 218 Cal. App. 4th at 698-99.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 756, 766.
251 id.
252 See Carolyn Whetzel, California Supreme Court Declines To Review Decision on Low-
Carbon Fuel Standard, ENERGY & CLIMATE REP. (BNA) (Nov. 29, 2013),
http://climate.bna.com/climate/summary- news.aspx?ID=255482.
253 See infra Part IV.A.
254 Petition for Rehearing En Banc of the AFPM Plaintiffs-Appellees, Rocky Mountain
Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507 (9th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 12-15131, 12-15135) [hereinafter
Petition for Rehearing En Banc].
255 Complaint, Indeck Corinth v. Paterson, No. 369 (N.Y. App. Div. May 18, 2009); Indeck
Energy, supra note 34. In a suit against the state of New York's RGGI program in 2009, New
York's quick settlement had Consolidated Edison Company agreeing to pay the cogeneration
project for the cost of its additional carbon allowances through the end of their pre-existing long-
term contracts. In addition to the Indeck project, the Brooklyn Navy Yard Co-Generation Project
and Selkirk Cogen Partners also received these complete settlements of all economic impact
shifted to the utility and/or its ratepayers. See Indeck Corinth, L.P. v. Paterson, et al., U.S.
CHAMBER LITIG. CENTER, http://www.chamberlitigation.com/indeck-corinth-lp-v-paterson-et-al
(last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
256 See Seven Northeast States Launch Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, ENV'T NEWS
SERVICE (Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/dec2005/2005-12-20-05.asp. See
generally Model Rule, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/design/
history/model rule (last visited Oct. 12, 2014). Beginning in April 2003, Governor George Pataki
of New York initiated the effort by inviting neighboring states to participate in a regional cap-
and-trade emissions program. Seven Northeast States Launch Regional Greenhouse Gas
2014]
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power plants in the region were capped at then-current levels,2 57 and the cap
would remain in place until 2015. RGGI states would then begin the process of
incrementally reducing emissions, with the goal of achieving a 10% reduction
by 2019,258 which recently was amended to make it 45% more demanding at an
earlier year.259 The ten northeast RGGI states raised approximately $1 billion of
RGGI auction proceeds realized from their auctions between 2009 and 201 1.260
This suit was brought by an independent cogeneration project which
had carbon compliance obligations imposed on it.261 In 2009, Indeck Energy,
the owner of a New York cogeneration power facility, sued the state of New
York regarding the constitutionality of its carbon regulation program, part of
the then ten-state RGGI, which imposes additional costs to purchase carbon
emission allowances on wholesale power sellers.262 New York quickly settled
the suit, granting plaintiffs complete relief and not imposing any of the
approximately $3 million annual additional costs on the specific wholesale
market plaintiffs, rather than let the court address the legality of its state
program. The settlement had Consolidated Edison Company and its ratepayers
agree to pay the cogeneration project for the cost of its additional carbon
allowances through the end of their pre-existing long-term contracts.263
Initiative, supra. The market-based design of the RGGI Memorandum of Understanding is a cap-
and-trade program. Id.
257 The regional base annual CO2 emissions cap will be equal to 121 million short tons.
Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 27, at 2.
258 Press Release, Reg'l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, States Reach Agreement on Proposed
Rules for the Nation's First Cap-and-Trade Program To Address Climate Change (Aug. 15,
2006), available at http://rggi.org/docs/modelrulerelease-8-15-06.pdf.
259 Gerald Silverman et al., Majority of States in Regional Initiative in Early Stages of
Implementing "Model Rule," 44 ENv'T REP. 1797 (2013). The new lower cap would limit
emissions from larger power plants to 91 million tons in 2014, and then lower it by 2.5%
annually from 2015 to 2020. Id. Two of the remaining nine RGGI states require new legislation
to adapt their programs, while the other seven states can do so by regulatory changes. Id.
260 REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, INC., INVESTMENT OF PROCEEDS FROM RGGI CO 2
ALLOWANCES 4 (2011), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/Investment of RGGI_
AllowanceProceeds.pdf. As determined individually by each state, 52% of RGGI funds were
used for energy efficiency, 11% for renewable energy, 14% to reduce consumer rates, and 1% for
other programs. Id.
261 William Funk, Constitutional Implications of Regional C0 2 Cap-and-Trade Programs:
The Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative as a Case in Point, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 353, 360 (2009) (discussing Indeck Corinth complaint).
262 Indeck Energy, supra note 34.
263 Id. In a suit against the state of New York's RGGI program in 2009, New York's quick
settlement had Consolidated Edison Company agreeing to pay the cogeneration project for the
cost of its additional carbon allowances through the end of their pre-existing long-term contracts.
Id. It allows the utility company to ask the New York Public Service Commission to pass through
the cost of these allowances, or approximately $3 million annually, to utility customers. Id. In
addition to the Indeck project, the Brooklyn Navy Yard Co-Generation Project and Selkirk
[Vol. 117
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The New York implementation of the RGGI carbon cap-and-trade
program was challenged in an additional suit, which was dismissed on
procedural grounds without reaching the merits. In the second New York RGGI
case,264 New York ratepayers argued that the program, which was never passed
by legislature, was improper if only implemented by regulation.265 This
complaint was denied on two grounds: (1) that the plaintiffs lacked standing,
and (2) that the doctrine of laches precluded the plaintiffs from bringing the
claim. 266 On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment.2 67 The
appellate court "assume[d], without deciding, that plaintiffs ha[d] standing to
bring this action., 268 Nonetheless, the court affirmed the dismissal because
"certain claims are time-barred and the remaining claims have been rendered
moot."
269
Most of the various state law challenges above attacked the state's
structural choices under a cap-and-trade mechanism as being unsupported
pursuant to principles of state administrative law or in violation of the CEQA.
These challenges contested the truncating of environmental considerations and
review in favor of carbon control, the basic choice of a cap-and-trade
mechanism, or the financial component of raising extensive revenues through
auction. Most of these half-dozen challenges either concluded with the state
losing the matter, the state escaping on procedural grounds in which the court
would not hear the matter, or are still pending. When litigation avoided
procedural defenses and advanced on the merits, the state defendants either
settled in favor of challengers or lost a majority of the lawsuits that proceeded
to a decision.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE GHG CAP-AND-TRADE
States which regulate carbon through cap-and-trade regulations are
concerned about the effects of their regulation imposing costs on in-state
entities and ultimately state ratepayers, which makes that same power or fuel
cost-disadvantaged, compared to out-of-state power or fuel not covered by cap-
and-trade regulation. Such concerns can cause state cap-and-trade regulation to
Cogen Partners also received complete settlements with all corporate economic impact shifted to
the utility and/or its ratepayers. Id.
264 Thrun v. Cuomo (Thrun 1), No. 4358-11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 13, 2012); Geoffrey Craig &
Gail Roberts, Lawsuit Disputes Legality of New York Participation in RGGI, Citing Lack of
Legislative Approval, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., July 4, 2011, at 10; Dan Wiessner, Judge Allows New
York to Participate in Environment Initiative, THOMSON REUTERS, June 13, 2012.
265 Craig & Roberts, supra note 264.
266 Thrun I, No. 4358-11.
267 Thrun v. Cuomo (Thrun 11), 90 N.Y.S. 320, 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
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be crafted in a manner to favor in-state entities and burden interstate commerce
originating outside the regulating state. Power moves in interstate commerce. A
significant number of independent renewable power generators now sell their
power wholesale interstate to redistributing utilities or other retail competitors,
which thereafter resell that power to retail customers.2 70 Wholesale electricity is
moving constantly in interstate commerce at the speed of light.27'
A major practical and policy problem identified by the RGGI states,272
as well as California, 273 is so-called "leakage" into the state of less-costly
power whose carbon content is not regulated or affected by state regulation by
external states. 274 Even where implementation of a particular cap-and-trade
270 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
205-06 (1983).
When combined with federal preemption law, one crucial result of these
energy market regulatory reforms has been "a massive shift in regulatory
jurisdiction from the states to the FERC."... The upshot of these federal and
state innovations in electricity regulation is that state regulators, despite their
continued authority over rates charged directly to consumers, have much less
actual authority over those rates than they did [earlier]. Local utilities now
obtain power largely through wholesale contracts subject to FERC's
exclusive regulation, rather than through self-generated and self-transmitted
power.... Although state regulators formerly took an extremely active role
so as to ensure the just and reasonable retail power rates, FERC has exclusive
jurisdiction over the wholesale rates that now drive the electric power market
and, as a practical matter, largely determine the rates ultimately charged to
the public.
Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 547 F.3d 1081
(9th Cir. 2008).
271 See STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER: DEVELOPMENT, COGENERATION,
UTILITY REGULATION (31st ed. 2013); Steven Ferrey, Inverting Choice of Law in the Wired
Universe: Thermodynamics, Mass, andEnergy, 45 WM. &MARYL. REV 1839, 1914 (2004).
272 Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 27, at 6.
273 CAP & TRADE SUBGROUP, CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM DESIGN
OPTIONS 8 (MAR. 27, 2006), available at http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/climate-actionteam/
reports/2006reportI2006-03-27_CAPANDTRADE.PDF.
274 See RGGI EMISSIONS LEAKAGE MULTI-STATE STAFF WORKING GRP., REG'L GREENHOUSE
GAS INITIATIVE, POTENTIAL EMISSIONS LEAKAGE AND THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS
INITIATIVE (RGGI): EVALUATING MARKET DYNAMICS, MONITORING OPTIONS, AND POSSIBLE
MITIGATION MECHANISMS ES-I (Mar. 14, 2007), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/
ilreport-final 3_14_07.pdf. RGGI States such as New Jersey, New York, Maryland, and
Delaware are bordered by states that are not signatories to RGGI and do historically produce a
large of volume of electricity from coal-fueled power plants. In the United States, Pennsylvania
ranks third in the amount of electricity generated, of which 40% is produced by coal-fired power
plants and 30% is exported to other states. Pennsylvania is the fourth-leading producer of coal in
the nation. See Existing U.S. Coal Plants, SOURCEWATCH, http://www.sourcewatch.org/
index.php/ExistingU.S. CoalPlants (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). Including Pennsylvania, four of
the five largest state users of coal-fired power border Pennsylvania or are one state away, and can
wheel power to the Atlantic state regions. Similarly, California imports power from 11 states,
including a large amount of coal-fired power. Energy Info. Admin., Dep't of Energy, A Quarter
of California's Electricity Comes from Outside the State, TODAY IN ENERGY (Dec. 19, 2011),
[Vol. 117
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energy regulation is otherwise within state authority, it still must be applied
within the constraints of the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, so as not to unduly burden interstate commerce. 75
Geographically-based restriction on interstate commerce, whether
discriminating for or against local commerce, raises dormant Commerce Clause
concerns, which are now being ventilated in legal challenges. Laws that attempt
directly or indirectly to regulate the conduct of out-of-state businesses also
violate the Commerce Clause.276 These laws can assume the form of added
taxes and charges on out-of-state goods. 77 States are prohibited from attaching
restrictions to any goods that they import from other states. 78
Where a state statute provided a tax exemption for sales of two types of
wine, both produced from products produced in the state, even though not
needing to mention the state by name, the effect was practically state-specific
discrimination, and it was found to be discriminatory and a violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause. 279 A state cannot regulate to favor or require use of
its own in-state energy resources, even for a small percentage of total use,28 °
nor can it, by regulation, harbor energy-related resources originating in the
state.281 In-state fuels cannot be required to be used by a state even for the
rationale to satisfy federal Clean Air Act requirements. 82 Income tax credits
cannot be given by a state only to in-state producers of fuel additives.2 83 State
regulation of biofuels was before the Supreme Court 25 years before it was
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfn?id=4370 (map illustrating import to California of
electricity from Southwest, Northwest, Canada, and Rocky Mountain States); CAL. ENERGY
COMM'N, 2006 NET SYSTEM POWER REPORT 4 (2007), http://www.energy.ca.gov/
2007publications/CEC-300-2007-007/CEC-300-2007-007.PDF (showing California imports
approximately 10% of its total electricity from out of state coal plants).
275 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
276 See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326-27, 343 (1989) (striking requirement that
the price of beer was not higher than that charged out-of-state).
277 See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 336-37 (1992) (invalidating an
Alabama law imposing an extra fee on imported hazardous waste).
278 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994) ("States and localities may
not attach restrictions to ... imports in order to control commerce in other States.").
279 Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 276 (1984); see also Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393.
280 See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-56 (1992) (overturning an Oklahoma
statute involving only a 10% allocation of the market to in-state producers); see also Alliance for
Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
281 See, e.g., New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982) (caling state
law prohibiting the out-of-state sale of its hydroelectric energy a "protectionist regulation"
precluded by the Commerce Clause).
282 See, e.g., Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 596-97 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding
that the Illinois Coal Act had intent to eliminate use of out-of-state coal by Illinois generators,
and was therefore invalid under Commerce Clause).
283 New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 278-80 (1988).
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recently raised in California.284 In New Energy Co. v. Limbach, the Supreme
Court struck as unconstitutional a state law that gave favorable tax treatment to
ethanol produced in-state, and held that health impacts addressed by the state
were only incidental benefits, while the Commerce Clause burden and violation
were not legally permitted.285
A. The Ninth Circuit Decision on Renewable Transportation C02
Emissions Cap-and-Trade
1. The California Low Carbon Fuel Standard
The Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) 286 was "designed to reduce
California's dependence on petroleum" and to "stimulate the production and
use of alternative, low-carbon fuels in California., 287 The LCFS regulates
transportation fuels that are "sold, supplied, or offered for sale in California"
288
and focuses on the "carbon intensity of fuels. '289 The LCFS's goal is to reduce
the carbon content of transportation fuels sold in California by 10% by the year
2020 from the year 2010 baseline.29 °
CARB's LCFS rule in California includes the lifecycle GHG emissions
of fuel, including emissions produced during production and transportation of
fuels to California.291 Carbon intensity is not limited to how much carbon the
fuel contains, but also includes the amount of carbon released in the full fuel
cycle.292 The provider's carbon intensity score is affected by the location of the
284 Id.
285 Id. at 271,279.
286 For more discussion of the LCFS program, see supra Part III.E.
287 AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CALIFORNIA'S Low CARBON FUEL STANDARD:
FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS 457 (2009), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2009/
lcfs09/lcfsfsor.pdf.
288 Id. at 330.
289 Id. at 148.
290 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95482-95483 (2014).
291 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1081 (E.D. Cal.
2011).
292 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95481(a)(38) (2014). The LCFS refers to this inclusive concept
as the "lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions," which is defined as
the aggregate quantity of greenhouse gas emissions (including direct
emissions and significant indirect emissions such as significant emissions
from land use changes), as determined by the Executive Officer, related to
the full fuel lifecycle, including all stages of fuel and feedstock production
and distribution, from feedstock generation or extraction through the
distribution and delivery and use of the finished fuel to the ultimate
consumer, where the mass values for all greenhouse gases are adjusted to
account for their relative global warming potential.
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commerce. Corn-derived ethanol produced in the Midwest is assigned a higher
carbon intensity score than chemically similar corn-derived ethanol produced
anywhere in California, regardless of its transportation within California.293
Thus, a chemically identical ethanol imported from the Midwest is deemed to
have a higher carbon intensity than ethanol produced anywhere in California,
making the Midwest product more expensive for fuel providers seeking to meet
the California fuel standard requirements.294
The LCFS rule was challenged in two court cases alleging that it
violates federal and state law. One was under California state law claims, 295 and
another under federal constitutional law. 296 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v.
Goldstene challenged the LCFS rule as violating the dormant Commerce
Clause of the Constitution.297 Specifically, the LCFS regulation incorporates
into its calculations the differences between indirectly associated carbon
emissions from transportation, the farming methods used to raise the
agricultural produce, and the fuel used to produce the electricity in the state
where the ethanol is produced.298
2. The Federal Trial Court Cap-and-Trade Decision
In December 2011, the federal District Court for the Eastern District of
California upheld the plaintiffs' argument, invalidating certain parts of the
LCFS rule and enjoining the rule's enforcement, as it "discriminates against
out-of-state corn-derived ethanol while favoring in-state corn ethanol and
impermissibly regulates extraterritorial conduct., 299 The court held that the
LCFS differentiates based on place of origin of the commerce and concluded
293 Id.
294 AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Low CARBON FUEL STANDARD QUESTION AND
ANSWER GUIDANCE DOCUMENT 4 (2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/LCFS_
Guidance_%28Final-v. 1.0%29.pdf. See generally, CAL. CONSUMER ALLIANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE
FUEL POLICIES, Low CARBON FUEL STANDARD ISSUE BRIEF 11 (n.d.), available at
http://www.fuelingcalifomrnia.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/LCFS-Issue-Brief-FINAL.pdf
("Based on forecasts by the California Energy commission (CEC) and the Energy Information
Administration (EIA), Sierra found that the availability of low carbon biofuel supplies will not be
plentiful enough to achieve the carbon intensity reductions required by the LCFS past 2014. If
there are not enough supplies to meet the LCFS standard's current timeline, there will be a large
shortage of fuel available to consumers after 2014.").
295 See supra Part III.E.
'9' Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
297 id.
298 Id. at 1088.
299 Id. at 1105. CARB attributed the difference in carbon intensity values to multiple scientific
factors in addition to geographic location factors (emissions related to shipping or transportation
of fuel). Id. at 1087-88. The court relied upon a "table" of Carbon Intensity values generated by
CARB. Id. at 1087.
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that the LCFS discriminates on its face against out-of-state corn-derived
ethanol.300
The trial court found that the LCFS served a legitimate local
purpose,301 but that the defendants had not met their burden to show that there
was not a nondiscriminatory means to adequately serve their objective.30 2 The
court found that CARB had several other means to address the state's purpose
without discriminating against out-of-state fuel products.30 3 The court here
incorporates the Supreme Court's Dean Milk requirement to choose the least
discriminatory or intrusive on interstate commerce means to regulate when it
balances local purpose against a statute which either discriminates on its face or
impermissibly controls conduct outside its borders.30 4
The court held that the LCFS "may not impose a barrier to interstate
commerce based on the distance that the product must travel in interstate
commerce." 30 5 The California federal trial court reached this conclusion,
relying in principal part on Supreme Court precedent in Dean Milk and West
Lynn Creamery v. Healy.30 6 Even though the LCFS does benefit some other
out-of-state producers or burdens some in-state producers, the court finds that
this does not absolve the LCFS from a finding that it discriminates on its
face 307: "[L]egislation favoring in-state economic interests is facially invalid
under the dormant Commerce Clause, even when such legislation also burdens
some in-state interests or includes some out-of-state interests in the favored
classification. '30 8 The court held that "this type of regulation 'forc[es] a
300 Id. at 1087.
301 Id. at 1093. The Rocky Mountain plaintiffs argued that the LCFS serves no local purpose,
but rather California is attempting to solve the national and international problem of climate
change. Id. The defendant state cited Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), where the
Supreme Court affirmed that "a state has a local and legitimate interest in reducing global
warming." Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
302 Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. The court did recognize that lifecycle analysis is a
widely accepted national and international approach to reduce carbon emissions, but this does not
mean there is not a nondiscriminatory means to achieve this goal on a local level. Id. The Rocky
Mountain plaintiffs offered many nondiscriminatory alternatives including a tax on fossil fuels or
solely regulating tailpipe emissions. Id. at 1093-94.
303 See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
304 Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
305 Id. at 1089.
306 Id. at 1089. Dean Milk struck a local ordinance which required milk sold in the city to be
pasteurized within five miles of the city, while West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186
(1994), held that a differential burden placed at any point in the stream of commerce on out-of-
state producers is constitutionally invalid. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
307 Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1089. For example, Brazilian sugarcane ethanol has a lower
intensity score than some Californian corn ethanol and in-state producers of corn ethanol are
penalized when importing corn from out-of-state. Id.
308 Id. (quoting Daghlian v. DeVry Univ. Inc., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1243 (C.D. Cal. 2007)).
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merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a
transaction in another,' causing the LCFS to 'directly regulate[] interstate
commerce. 
309
3. The Ninth Circuit Cap-and-Trade Reversal
The Ninth Circuit recently reversed the trial court finding of
unconstitutionality, in a split decision with a dissent. The majority opinion
determines that it is acceptable for a state to calculate transportation CO 2 in the
carbon emissions index or rating of delivered fuel. The Ninth Circuit majority
distinguishes that the Supreme Court precedent in Hunt v. Washington Apple,31°
applied to out-of-state "Midwest producers' use of coal-fired electricity[,] also
does not merit respect under Hunt."311 The Ninth Circuit majority goes on to
state that "[t]he dormant Commerce Clause does not require California to
ignore the real differences in carbon intensity among out-of-state" product
pathways to California, including the type of electricity consumed in the region
of production and the distance of travel of the product to California.3 12
However, in contrast to some past decisions' imposition of fees on out-
of-state commerce, 313 the Rocky Mountain majority decision states that it is not
unconstitutional for a state to devise and impose a regulatory index which
results in out-of-state producers having to purchase additional credits or pay
fees, which result in a significant new revenue flow to the state.314 According to
this Ninth Circuit decision, a state environmental purpose to reduce GHGs
emitted in the state is enough to impose such regulation and costs. For scientific
reasons, the California Appellate Court majority would allow regulatory
incentives discouraging the importation of a commodity in interstate
commerce, such as trash, being originated from geographic zones outside the
state entering California. This shifts the primary discrimination back to the
distance of travel in interstate commerce: geographic discrimination based on
the point of origin of the commerce before it travels the distance to California.
The Ninth Circuit majority held that it is defensible to discriminate in
state regulation based on (1) the average carbon-intensity of electricity
production where the good is produced when electricity is used in the
manufacture of items in commerce and (2) the distance that the good travels
309 Id. at 1092 (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573, 582 (1986)). If a provider changes its part of the fuel's lifecycle, such as changing its
transportation mechanism to California, this change must be submitted to CARB. Id.
310 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977).
311 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1092 (9th Cir. 2013).
312 Id. at 1093.
313 See Steven Ferrey, Can the Ninth Circuit Overrule the Supreme Court on the
Constitution?, 93 NEB. L. REv. (forthcoming 2015).
314 Corey, 730 F.3d at 1104.
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from origin to use.3 15 For such a statute or regulation to be upheld, the state
usually must establish that there is a compelling state interest for which the
statute is the least intrusive means to achieve that interest.
316
The written dissent to the appellate court opinion notes that, at oral
argument, California admitted that there were means less burdensome on
interstate commerce "to use lifecycle analysis to reduce GHG emissions. '317
The dissent notes that California assumed that ethanol produced outside of
California is less efficiently produced, without looking at individual plants
producing ethanol.318 It found this to choose the discriminatory means to
regulate, rather than choose the nondiscriminatory alternative to regulate
commerce across California borders.319 The burden is on California to
demonstrate that no less burdensome regulatory incentives were available to
control GHGs, and the dissent concludes that California admitted that such
alternatives were available and were not taken.32°
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that state regulation does not
need to "be drafted explicitly along state lines in order to demonstrate its
discriminatory design.",32 Regulation need not facially mention discrimination
against out-of-state entrants to be held in violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause.322 A regulation which "evinces" discriminatory purpose against
interstate commerce, "or unambiguously discriminates in its effect . . . almost
always is 'invalid per se.', 32 3 Even where a statute is drafted in a fashion which
is facially neutral rather than expressly discriminatory, for example by not
mentioning the geographic location of the commerce but otherwise using other
315 Id. at 1097, 1105.
316 Trevor D. Stiles, Renewable Resources and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 4 ENVTL. &
ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 34, 59, 60-61 (2009) (outlining a history of the dormant Commerce
Clause).
317 Corey, 730 F.3d at 1109 (quoting hearing transcript).
318 Id.
319 1d. at 1109-10.
320 Id.
321 Id. at 1097; Amerada Hess Corp. v. N.J. Dep't of Treasury, 490 U.S. 66, 76 (1989); see
also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994) (striking local trash
processing requirement); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504
U.S. 353, 355 (1992) (striking ordinance banning disposal of out-of-county waste); Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 350, 356 (1951) (striking ordinance requiring milk to be
processed within five miles of town).
322 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1081 (E.D. Cal.
2011); Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 431 (2d Cir. 2013).
323 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 209 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting
Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 108 (2d. Cir. 2001)).
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terms that result in a geographic preference, a court can apply a strict scrutiny
standard where the state law has a discriminatory effect.
324
The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits actions that are either facially
discriminatory against or unduly burdensome to interstate commerce.325 A state
cannot regulate in favor of, or require use of, its own in-state energy
resources, 6 nor can it, by regulation, harbor energy-related resources
originating in the state.327 In-state fuels cannot be required to be used by a state
even for the rationale to satisfy federal Clean Air Act requirements. 328 Any
geographic discrimination by a state, whether along state or other geographic
lines, is suspect to strict scrutiny by the court. The dissent notes that "[i]n
making [the] geographic distinction, the [regulation] patently discriminates
against interstate commerce. 32 9
This Ninth Circuit opinion did not receive a majority for rehearing en
banc33° and, without a formal split in the circuits, certiorari was denied by the
Supreme Court in 2014.331 Several aspects of the majority opinion are
controversial for refashioning the past 75 years of U.S. Supreme Court
determinations on the dormant Commerce Clause.3 32 Greater discussion of this
controversy is beyond the scope of this Article, but this pending controversy is
covered in detail elsewhere.333
324 Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391 ("The ordinance is no less discriminatory because in-state or in-
town processors are also covered by the prohibition."); Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 361; S.-Cent.
Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984) ("'[The] Court has viewed with
particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the home State
that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere. Even where the State is pursuing a clearly
legitimate local interest, this particular burden on commerce has been declared to be virtually per
se illegal."' (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970))); Hunt v. Wash. State
Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-53 (1977).
325 See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338-39 (2008).
326 See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-56 (1992); Alliance for Clean Coal v.
Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
327 See New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982).
328 See Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 596-97 (7th Cir. 1995).
329 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1108 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Or. Waste Sys. Inc. v. Dep't ofEnvtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100 (1994)).
330 Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 254 ("[T]he matter failed to receive a majority
of the votes of the nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc consideration.").
331 Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014).
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B. Other State Cap-and-Trade Challenges
Other recent federal court challenges on cap-and-trade aspects of RGGI
carbon control, based on constitutional grounds of the dormant Commerce
Clause, have resulted in successful challenges.
1. Massachusetts Cap-and-Trade Regulation
There was a successful suit alleging that Massachusetts's renewable
energy tradable energy credits under capped incentives violated the
Constitution.334 The program was successfully challenged on constitutional
grounds in 2010 by TransCanada Power, the owner of a Maine wind project.
335
The suit alleged that Massachusetts's limitation on eligible Solar Renewable
Energy Credits (SRECs) as well as issuance of long-term power purchase
contracts only to Massachusetts companies both discriminated against out-of-
state renewable energy projects in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.
After stating that it had confidence in its position, Massachusetts
immediately settled the litigation so as to avoid a court decision, providing that
TransCanada would be eligible for these programs.337 Massachusetts
disqualified the already-completed in-state project winners of the original
reverse-bidding auction for long-term power purchase agreements for
renewable power and began again the utility request for out-of-state as well as
in-state competitors to bid.338 The settlement allowed TransCanada to convert
certain otherwise ineligible tradable renewable energy credits into eligible
SRECs for contracts that did not qualify under the original regulations.339
334 Complaint at 1-2, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 4:10-cv-40070 (D. Mass.
Apr. 16, 2010) [hereinafter TransCanada Complaint], available at
http://www.ohiogreenstrategies.com/documents/transcanada.pdf. TransCanada is an independent
power company with a wind project in Maine, and challenged the constitutionality of
Massachusetts's renewable portfolio standard program, given that under previous Massachusetts
law, out-of-state generators were allowed to bid to supply power. Id.; Erin Ailworth, State
Looking to Settle Suit Over Law on Clean Energy, Bos. GLOBE, May 27, 2010,
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2010/05/27/lawsuithits-mass_law.promotingjlocal_
energy-providers/.
335 TransCanada Complaint, supra note 334, at 1-2.
336 Id. at 20-22.
337 See Partial Settlement Agreement, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 4: 10-cv-
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2. The Recent Seventh Circuit Energy Regulatory Holding on the
Constitution
Judge Richard Posner, speaking for the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in a unanimous decision, affirmed the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission's approval of the Midwest Independent Service Operator's
(MISO)340 proportionate customer utility allocation of transmission costs for
high-voltage transmission lines to move renewable wind power to populated
areas.341 For authority for its holding on the respective jurisdiction of state and
federal government to regulate electricity, the opinion relied on a 2012 law
review article on constitutional federalism energy issues authored by Professor
Ferrey.342 The Seventh Circuit declared unconstitutional state regulation
limiting state renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) to in-state generation as a
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause: "[It] trips over an insurmountable
constitutional objection. Michigan cannot, without violating the commerce
clause of Article I of the Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state
renewable energy."
343
Tradable energy credits applied to in-state renewable power and denied
to identical out-of-state renewable power sold in the state were held
unconstitutional.344  This is the highest federal court ruling on the
constitutionality of state energy regulation under the Commerce Clause; the
Supreme Court has never been presented with this question. However, of note,
Justice Scalia, concurring in the majority in West Lynn Creamery, although not
an energy matter, submitted that "subsidies for in-state industry.., would
clearly be invalid under any formulation of the Court's guiding principle" for
dormant Commerce Clause cases.345
340 Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 781 (7th Cir. 2013). MISO's service area
extends from the Canadian border, east to Michigan and parts of Indiana, south to northern
Missouri, and west to eastern areas of Montana. Id. at 770.
141 Id. at 771-72. MISO allocated the costs of the transmission projects among all of the
utilities who draw power from the MISO grid in proportion to each utility's overall volume of
usage; FERC approved MISO's rate design, which led some states to initiate court appeal. Id.
342 Id. at 776 (citing Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The
Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX. J. OIL GAS &
ENERGY L. 59, 69, 106-07 (2012)).
343 Id. Michigan actually initiated the issue of in-state electric power discrimination in its RPS
program as a demonstration that out-of-state power transmitted to it was not recognized as of the
same value as in-state electricity, therefore Michigan should not pay a share of power line tariffs
transmitting power from out of state that did not have equal recognition and benefit. Id. at 775-
76. Instead of supporting its position, this assertion caused Judge Posner to respond to this
assertion, even though it was not the tariff issue before the court. Id. at 776.
344 Id.
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V. FINAL THOUGHTS
"Cap-and-trade" is the modem 21st century mode du jour of
environmental law. It is a key mechanism employed in the U.S. Clean Air
Act,346 integral to the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol for
GHG control, 347 and the regulatory foundation of carbon control in several U.S.
states.348 This modem cap-and-trade metric for environmental regulation has
been squarely in the telescopic sight of litigation by aggrieved parties. The
result has rendered the EPA's cap-and-trade environmental air regulations
reaching the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in the past half-dozen years to be
judged illegal in every one of five challenges. 349 The grounds for these
uninterrupted legal disqualifications of the EPA environmental air regulation
programs are based on determinations that EPA cap-and-trade programs are
* exceeding EPA authority,
* not respecting state/federal jurisdictional lines,
* not factually supported, and
* not based on solid scientific evidence.
Key pieces of rulemakings on environmental and energy matters
include a quantitative method, reasoned determination, factual scientific basis,
and regulatory precision on the administrative record. The D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals stressed that an agency has broad leeway in deciding how much of a
scientific margin of safety is sufficient in environmental matters,350 with the
court exercising discretion to reassess evidence based on its own judgment.351
Where there is scientific evidence as a critical part of the record, such as from
an advisory committee, if the agency disagrees with its advisory committee, it
"must give a sound scientific reason for its disagreement." 35 2 U.S. Clean Air353
346 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (2013).
347 See FERREY, supra note 2, at 51-54.
348 Id. at 79-109.
349 See supra Part II and accompanying notes 30-33, 35, 39.
350 Mississippi v. EPA, 723 F.3d 246, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2013). In 2008, the EPA set both the
primary and secondary ozone standards at 75 parts per billion, averaged over an eight-hour
period. Id. at 253. The EPA also issued a secondary air quality standard for ozone (designed to
protect public welfare), which was the same as the primary standard. Id. The court also stated
that the EPA did not have to show that old standards were wrong due to errors or new evidence,
in order to modify them. Id. at 273. The court said that the EPA had failed to give a clear enough
explanation for making the secondary standard equal to the primary standard, and had failed to
state explicitly "what level of protection was 'requisite to protect the public welfare."' Id.
351 Id. at 265.
352 Id. at 267. An independent health panel created under the federal Clean Air Act
recommended that a more protective ozone health standard was justified. Id. at 257. The EPA
need not always be as health-protective as its scientists recommend. Id. at 267.
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (2013).
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regulation proceeds with distinct and separate roles at both the federal and state
levels.354
Cap-and-trade regulation crafted by the EPA, when examined and
subsequently detonated by federal court opinions, has had the impact of a legal
neutron bomb, requiring reconstruction from scratch of the barely-standing
regulatory programs around it. It is not the structure of allowed trading per se,
but the lack of administrative foundation underneath agency decisions on the
caps and the agency overreach beyond the substantive grant of congressional
authority that have been the basis of critical decisions of the D.C. Circuit.355
These judicial decisions leave accessible an administrative on-ramp at a
deliberate speed and clarity to implement cap-and-trade regulation of air
emissions. There is not something inherently judicially suspect about cap-and-
trade as a regulatory tool, if it is properly designed, technically substantiated,
and implemented.
At the state level, cap-and-trade regulation to mitigate climate change
emissions has not been shut out so extensively as federal use of cap-and-trade.
Legal claims assert administrative and environmental law violations by state
environmental agencies.356 Of several key cases, the challengers have prevailed
in court or received a favorable settlement in more than half the challenges
against state cap-and-trade regulations in which the legal claims have
proceeded on the merits without a procedural defense allowing government to
sidestep the merits of the claim. 357 When raising state law claims, the challenge
is likely to have venue in state court before state judges, and some of these
disputes have resulted in judgments upholding the state's chosen cap-and-trade
regulation. 358 In a New York dispute regarding the legality of RGGI GHG
regulation, the litigation was quickly settled by New York with benefits to the
challenging regulated stakeholder plaintiffs, to avoid precedent being issued
construing cap-and-trade. 359 Subsequent suits challenging RGGI cap-and-trade
regulation were dismissed on procedural grounds without reaching the
360merits.
In addition to administrative law claims, the constitutional Commerce
Clause is implicated when states regulate air emissions, renewable energy
development, or GHGs in a manner which facially, or in purpose or effect,
favors in-state commerce. For example, 29 states and the District of Columbia
have enacted RPS requirements creating tradable credits related to renewable
354 EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 13, at 182-203.
355 See supra Part II and accompanying notes 30-33, 35, 39.
356 See supra Part III.
357 See supra Part III.
358 States have deflected, through procedural defenses, some of the litigation from reaching the
legal merits of the regulation. See supra notes 248-54 and accompanying text.
359 See supra Part III.F.
360 See e.g., Thrun 1, No. 4358-11,42 ELR 20132 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 13, 2012).
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electricity production. 361 Twenty-two of these 29 states have incorporated
provisions which to a greater or lesser degree favor in-state renewable energy
commerce in electricity and burden out-of-state renewable electricity
production.362 The U.S Supreme Court stated that there is nothing more
fundamentally in interstate commerce than electricity: "[I]t is difficult to
conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than electric energy, a
product used in virtually every home and every commercial or manufacturing
facility. No State relies solely on its own resources in this respect. 363
Some RPS programs consciously incorporate a design which entirely
negates credit for out-of-state generated renewable electricity even after that
electricity has been delivered through interstate commerce into the consuming
state and consumed.364 Such programs were recently declared unanimously by
the federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to be fundamentally
unconstitutional in dicta, without a Commerce Clause challenge squarely
before the court.365 Some dormant Commerce Clause challenges have been
settled in favor of the challengers.366 So this chessboard drama will continue
until the Supreme Court eventually hears a case involving state regulation of
renewable energy or carbon gases.
As to a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution,367 there was a split decision with the dissent in this circuit opinion
and the judge in the federal trial court both finding California's LCFS carbon
regulation program to be unconstitutional.368 Additionally, the majority of
judges hearing challenges to the LCFS cap-and-trade cases nationally hold it to
be illegal on either state or constitutional grounds.369
Despite lack of judicial clarity, and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
repeatedly holding various EPA cap-and-trade regulations to be illegal, cap-
and-trade has a future. It is still popular because it allows trading of emission
allowances and credits. The fatal legal issues with cap-and-trade regulation are
the EPA not following administrative law requirements for providing sufficient
record support for the details of its cap-and-trade program design and
requirements. These omissions, if fatal to program design, are remediable, and
361 See Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The Commerce Clause
Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 59, 62
(2012) [hereinafter Threading the Constitutional Needle].
362 Id. at 72-80.
363 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982).
364 Threading the Constitutional Needle, supra note 361, at 74-75.
365 Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013).
366 Partial Settlement Agreement, supra note 337.
367 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2013).
368 Corey, 730 F.3d at 1109; Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d
1071, 1105 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
369 See supra Part IV.A.
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the Supreme Court in 2014 afforded more deference to EPA cap-and-trade
discretion.370 However, this Supreme Court decision is limited to the single
CSAPR cap-and-trade program. There are more cap-and-trade regulations to
come, and more challenges and judicial decisions. The future outcome of cap-
and-trade regulation is still very much in play in the courts, and will sculpt the
contours of 21 st century environmental regulation in a market economy.
370 EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
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